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Ex Post Assessment of European
Competition Policy in the Payment Sector:
The Visa Europe 2010 Commitments
Decision*
Alen Veljan, Scott McInnes & Nicolas Petit
§3.01 INTRODUCTION
The payment sector has been subject to many European Union (EU) competition law
decisions over the past twenty years. The decisions cover a wide range of competition
law issues, from antitrust concerns (such as the European Commission’s (EC) 2007
prohibition decisions against the GIE Cartes Bancaires about the so-called MERFA fee
and against Visa Europe for having refused to grant a license to Morgan Stanley) to the
review of proposed concentrations by the EC (amongst others in 2016 M.7873
Worldline/Equens/Paysquare; in 2018 Case M.9089 – Hellman & Friedman/Concardis
Payment Group, in 2019 Case M.9452 – Global Payments/TSYS or in 2020
Worldline/Ingenico and Mastercard/Nets).
A particular focus of competition enforcement in the payment sector has con-
cerned interchange fees (IF). Several competition law decisions by the EC and various
national competition authorities (NCAs), as well as judgments from the EU courts,
have sought to reduce IFs, before subjecting them to caps with the entry into force of
the EU Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR) on 9 December 2015.1
* This report also benefitted from helpful comments and directions from Alfonso Lamadrid
(Garrigues), Avantika Chowdhury (Oxera), Helène Bourguignon (MAPP Economics), and Dennis
Carlton (University of Chicago Booth School of Business).
1. Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on
interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123/1, 19.5.2015.
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This report ambitions to provide an ex post assessment of the EC’s efforts to
reduce IFs through competition enforcement. In particular, we focus on enforcement
initiatives against Mastercard and Visa (Visa Inc. and Visa International, as well as Visa
Europe) concerning IF. We study the economic impact of the EC Visa Europe 2010
commitment decision (the decision) with the support of a methodology known as
Difference-in-Difference (DiD) analysis. Our ultimate goal is to get a first empirical
sense of the decision’s consequences on consumer welfare, and in turn to draw lessons
for law and policy from this exercise.
A word on method. The report uses the Visa Europe 2010 commitments decision
as the basis for an ex post economic analysis. The choice of this decision is based on the
fact that it covers both the IF applicable to cross-border transactions within the European
Economic Area (EEA), i.e., card issuer located in one EEA Member State and merchant
located in another EEA Member State, as well as the IF applicable to domestic
transactions in nine EEA Member States (debit). In this, the Visa Europe 2010
commitments decision provides a better target than other decisions like the Visa 2002
and Mastercard 2007 decisions which only impacted the IF applicable to cross-border
transactions within the EEA (which, at that point in time, only represented a very
limited share of total payment transactions). Admittedly, the next EC decision of
February 2014 regarding Visa Europe could have also been included in our ex post
evaluation. But we considered that studying this last decision would create too much
noise, given the then imminent implementation of the IFR (9 December 2015) and the
inability to separate its impact from the latter event.2
Besides, we take a broad understanding of consumer welfare, not limited to price
reductions towards customers. Instead of focusing on whether payment fees
towards/single costs charged to merchants and subsequently cardholders have de-
clined following enforcement, our analysis measures efficiency as a whole. Drawing on
the premise that electronic payments constitute socially efficient and welfare-
enhancing services,3 several additional metrics can be used as proxies to measure the
consumer welfare impacts of competition enforcement by the EC, namely size of card
transactions and volumes, merchant acceptance, card issuing and the displacement of
cash. With this background, our report thus aims to test whether the following
hypothesis is true or not:
2. Visa Europe committed to a reduction of the IF applicable to cross-border acquired transactions,
but this commitment was only effective as of 1 January 2015. Visa Europe also committed to a
reduction of IF applicable to domestic credit card transactions in a number of EEA Member States,
but those commitments were only meant to become applicable in approximately February 2016
and were therefore preceded by the IFR IF caps that became applicable as of 9 December 2015.
3. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange fees for
card-based payment transactions, European Commission (24 July 2013), https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A52013PC0550. For the avoidance of doubt, we are not
stipulating that card payments are socially efficient and welfare-enhancing, irrelevant of their
price structure or level. Rather, by purposely disregarding the monetary characteristics (which,
albeit altered post-enforcement, existed in both the pre-and post-enforcement environments) we
aim to draw insights from other metrics, in order to subsequently assess any potential impacts of
pricing alterations on system participants’ behaviour.
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The EC’s competition enforcement has had a positive, statistically significant
causal effect on the usage of consumer card payments, card issuance, merchant
acceptance and cash displacement.
The report is structured as follows. Section §3.02 provides a brief introduction on
the functioning of four-party card schemes (e.g., Mastercard, Visa, Cartes Bancaires,
Bancontact), thereby highlighting the role of IFs. Section §3.03 provides a high level
and selective review of the rich economic literature on two-sided markets. Section
§3.04 offers a chronological overview of EU competition cases in relation to card
payments between 2002 and 2019, highlighting the long-term evolution of the EC’s
thinking about IFs. This section also helps to lay down the factual background of the EC
Visa Europe 2010 commitment decision, which forms the essence of our empirical
analysis. Section §3.05 describes the data set and methodology used to perform our ex
post evaluation of the decision. Section §3.06 presents our empirical results. Sections
§3.07 and §3.08 discuss economic implications and look back in hindsight on the EC’s
2002–2019 competition effort against IF. Section §3.09 concludes.
§3.02 THE FUNCTIONING OF FOUR-PARTY CARD SCHEMES
A transaction within a four-party card payment scheme involves five different parties:
(1) the cardholder who uses a card to conduct a purchase; (2) the merchant (or retailer)
who provides the goods or services, and accepts the card as a means of payment; (3)
the card issuer (issuer) who issues the card to the cardholder, and is in charge of
transferring funds for the purchased goods to the acquirer; (4) the acquirer who
provides technical support to the merchant to allow it to accept card payments and
thereupon receives the funds from the issuer, and passes those funds on to the
merchant; and (5) the card scheme (e.g., Visa, Mastercard, Bancontact in Belgium, GIE
Cartes Bancaires in France, Pagobancomat in Italy, Multibanco in Portugal, Dankort in
Denmark, etc.) that, in particular, provides licences to issuers to issue cards with its
brand, and to acquirers for the acquisition of transactions under its scheme/ brand.
The IF is a fee paid by the acquirer to the issuer on every single transaction. In the
period preceding the regulation of the IF, fees could (i) either be determined by the card
schemes, (ii) collectively by issuers and acquirers in a given country, or (iii) bilaterally
between one issuer and one acquirer (although the cases of bilaterally agreed IF were
relatively rare due to the arising complexities, in particular in a cross-border context
where the issuer and acquirer were located in different countries). With this back-
ground, EC’s enforcement only targeted the IF set by the schemes (rather than by
issuers and acquirers, whether multilaterally or bilaterally). The fee set by the schemes
have been referred to as multilateral IF (MIF), or fallback IF, or default IF. We call it the
(default) IF.
The acquirer charges a fee to the merchant in relation to every transaction that it
acquires for that merchant, typically referred to as the merchant service charge (MSC).
Chapter 3: Payment Card Cases §3.02
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The MSC typically includes (1) the IF paid by the acquirer to the issuer, (2) the scheme
fees paid by the acquirer to the card scheme, and (3) a service fee resulting in revenue/
a margin for the acquirer. The MSC is typically either a blended price (e.g., 2% of the
amount of each transaction) or an ‘IF plus’ MSC (i.e., IF plus scheme fees plus an
acquirer fee). The diagram below summarises the above.
It is noteworthy that, whilst interchange fee savings arising from reductions of
the default IF by the schemes are automatically passed on by issuers to acquirers, it
cannot be taken for granted that reductions of the default IF will be passed through by
acquirers to merchants, and by merchants to their customers (e.g., consumers) in the
form of lower (retail) prices. Multiple other factors (e.g., the scheme fees and the MSC)
influence the intensity of pass-through from acquirers to third parties.
Two types of payment transactions can be distinguished: (1) domestic transac-
tions which, at the time, were transactions where the issuer and the merchant were
located in the same country; and (2) cross-border transactions which were transactions
where the issuer and the merchant were located in two different countries. We refer to
transactions involving an issuer located in one EEA Member State and a merchant
located in another EEA Member State as Intra-EEA transactions. Transactions where
the issuer is located outside of the EEA and the merchant located within an EEA
Member State are referred to as inbound interregional transactions. The default IF set
by Mastercard/Visa for Intra-EEA transactions applied to Intra-EEA transactions, but
also as default for domestic transactions in EEA Member States unless a different
domestic IF was applicable (either set by the scheme itself, or agreed bilaterally
between an issuer and an acquirer, or agreed multilaterally by several issuers/
acquirers in that country).
To date, the entire body of EC enforcement initiatives against IF concerns
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of sale.4 The EC never issued any decision in relation to commercial cards (also known
as corporate cards).5 To our knowledge, the EC never publicly explained why it never
issued a decision against the IF applicable to commercial cards. Some explanations
may be drawn from the following facts. Commercial cards are less prevalent than
consumer cards and therefore represent a lower amount of IF paid by acquirers (and
often merchants) to issuers. In addition, American Express (Amex) is a significant
player in the commercial card space, but the EC always took the view that competition
law and in particular Article 101 TFEU (previously Article 81 EC) could not be enforced
against Amex and its IF or equivalent fee arrangements since Amex was an indepen-
dent company (Article 101 TFEU requires establishing existence of an ‘association of
undertakings’, ‘agreement’, or ‘concerted practice’). Therefore, a concern to maintain
a level playing field between Mastercard/Visa on the one hand and Amex on the other,
in the commercial card space, might explain the EC’s forbearance towards
Mastercard/Visa in relation to commercial cards IF.6
§3.03 LITERATURE REVIEW
The economic literature looks at card payment systems as a textbook model of
‘two-sided market’. The model studies how platforms – here card payment systems –
overcome the challenge of finding a ‘viable business model’ to bring distinct user
groups – here merchants and cardholders – ‘on board’.7 A key insight from the
economic literature is that the structure of prices on various sides of the market, rather
than the (overall) price level, is what creates a possibility of economic exchange.
In the card payment case, systems that provide services to acquirers and issuers
must set fees that allow simultaneous interactions between user groups. The platform
can set a balancing mechanism, in our case an interchange fee, and thereby attempt to
sponsor consumers’ card usage with a cross-subsidy bearing on acquirers.8 The impact
of changes in the size and structure of the interchange fee will in turn depend on the
pass-through behaviour of acquirers, merchants and issuers and is thus closely related
to the competitive characteristics of the industry segment under consideration.9 All
network markets10 exhibit externalities.11 The most prominent externalities in payment
4. Not ATMs.
5. Essentially (pre-IFR) cards issued to companies (for onward distribution to their employees) or
self-employed professionals for business expenses.
6. Throughout this report, we refer to credit/ debit/ prepaid cards for consumer cards, not for
commercial cards.
7. Jean Tirole, Market Failures and Public Policy, 105(6) American Econ. Rev. 1665, 1682 (2015).
8. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets’, 1(3) J. Eur.
Econ. Ass’n 990, 1029 (2003).
9. Alen Veljan, Influence of Intra-and Inter-System Concentration on the Pre-regulated Setting of
Interchange Fees Within Cooperative Card Payment Networks, 21 J. Banking Reg. 139, 151 (2020).
10. Further examples include videogame platforms, newspapers and marketplaces. Jean-Charles
Rochet and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy (12 March 2004), https://web.mit.edu/14.271/www/rochet_tirole.pdf.
11. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8(2) J. Econ. Persps.
93, 115 (1994).
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networks are adoption (card holding) and usage (card payment) externalities.12 The
value of membership to one user is affected by the addition or the loss of a marginal
user. The demand for a network good is therefore a function of both its price and the
expected size of the network. This is different from the demand for a standard good
which is only a function of price.13
In a two-sided market, the platform sets prices in light of the demand elasticities
of the various user groups. In card payment networks, the price will typically be set to
maximise the overall profits to network participants, recover common costs, and
provide the service to the largest possible number of members.14 Economists and
policymakers generally consider that a single interchange fee is more efficient to
equilibrate payment markets than bilaterally negotiated agreements.15 Accordingly,
socially efficient pricing may result in fees for participants on a particular side (in our
case card issuers) below marginal costs.16 The economic literature suggests that this is
not problematic even under an antitrust eye. In his Nobel Prize address, Jean Tirole
cautioned against ‘misleadingly complain about predation’ and called regulators to
refrain from ‘applying standard antitrust ideas where they do not belong’.17 The EC has
followed Tirole’s admonition by not raising a categorical objection against IF.18
Merchants’ lower price elasticity relative to cardholders explains the allocation of
IF costs to the acquirer side. Strong competition within the merchant sector and the
convenience benefits cardholders reap when using card payments create strong
incentives for merchants to accept card payments. Additionally, when cardholders
collect rewards on certain cards, their willingness to pay with different means like cash
or checks is even lower.19 This signals that merchants must take cards and lack power
to refuse card payments.20 Some studies suggest that merchants might even accept
cards in instances where the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits of the card
payment.21 Last, demand elasticities of network participants are inversely related to the
size of the platform. As the platform share of market output grows, network
12. Sujit Chakravorti, Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theory and Evidence, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (18 November 2009), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/
policy-discussion-papers/2009/pdp-8.
13. Katz and Shapiro, supra n. 11.
14. Julian Wright, The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, 52(1) J.
Indus. Econ. 1, 26 (2004).
15. William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives,
26(3) The J. L. & Econ. 541, 588, (1983). In addition, an IF avoids the free-rider problem that
arises when the number of participants within a network increase.
16. David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20(2) Yale J. Reg. 327,
379, (2003).
17. Tirole, supra n. 7.
18. See the EC’s legal interpretation in Commission Decision 2002/914/EC of 24 July 2002 on
COMP/29.373 – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee (notified under document
number C(2002) 2698), OJ L 318/17, 22.11.2002.
19. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of
Payment Card Associations, 33(4) The RAND J. Econ. (2002).
20. John Vickers, Public Policy and the Invisible Price: Competition Law, Regulation and the
Interchange Fee, 4(1) Competition L.J. 5, 21 (2005).
21. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Must-Take Cards: Merchant Discounts and Avoided Costs,
9(3) J. Eur. Econ. Ass’n 462, 495 (2011).
Alen Veljan, Scott McInnes & Nicolas Petit§3.03
50
participants become more dependent on the payment system and less elastic to pricing
changes.22
Another important insight from the economic literature stresses the ambiguous
contribution to social welfare of increased competition between payment schemes.
When antitrust decision makers first laid their eyes on payment markets, they
understandably hypothesised that blunted competition between card schemes was a
possible cause for high (and above socially optimal) IF. Guthrie and Wright however
showed that the reverse conclusion was plausible. As card schemes compete for
partnerships with issuing banks, they increase benefits towards issuers. With increas-
ing scheme competition, all things equal, IF rise, leading to inflated costs of card
processing for merchants. Due to this dysfunctional competition, scheme competition
can increase rather than decrease – as would be the predictable outcome with most
industries – consumer prices. Further, the risk of a differentiated treatment of propri-
etary card schemes that are not utilising IF to achieve a desired fee structure and
cooperative card schemes can ultimately result in a competitive advantage.23
Of course, the efficiency of the IF at ‘bringing all sides on board’ can be defeated
in two sets of circumstances. First, the IF will not raise scheme output in instances
where merchants can perfectly (without friction) surcharge consumers for the use of
costly payment cards.2425 Second, the IF ends up being paid fully by consumers in all
instances where perfectly competitive issuing, acquiring and merchant markets result
in full pass-through of any interchange increases or decreases.26 Leaving aside these
mostly hypothetical scenarios, scholars and practitioners have spilt much ink trying to
determine private and socially optimal IF levels. Initially, the EC endorsed an issuer
cost methodology as a benchmark for compliant IF. The EC abandoned this approach
after the Mastercard 2007 decision and adopted a new methodology known as the
tourist test or merchant indifference test (MIT).27 Based upon the marginal costs and
benefits of accepting a card payment, and under consideration of the applicable
externalities, a level of IF is identified that makes the merchant indifferent between
accepting card payments versus other payment instruments. When the tourist test is
retained, any change in pricing within one side of the market will cause spillover effects
on the other.28 Due to the presence of multiple cost components within the network in
addition to the interchange fee (such as scheme fees and acquirer processing fee that
both typically form part of the MSC charged by the acquirer to the merchant as well as
22. Jean-Charles Rochet and Julian Wright, Credit Card Interchange Fees, ECB Working Paper Series
(1138), 4, 30, (2009).
23. Graeme Guthrie and Julian Wright, Competing Payment Schemes, 55(1) The J. Indus. Econ. 37,
67 (2007).
24. Rochet and Tirole, supra n. 19.
25. Joshua Gans and Stephen King, The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, 3(1) The
B.E. J. in Econ. Analysis & Pol’y 1, 16 (2003).
26. Richard Schmalensee and David S. Evans, The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their
Regulation: An Overview, MIT Sloan Working Paper No 4548-05, (23 May 2005), http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.744705.
27. Rochet and Tirole, supra n. 21.
28. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100(4) American Econ. Rev. 1642, 1672
(2010).
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a cardholder fee that the issuer may charge to the cardholder), an alteration of other
cost components can potentially neutralise any alterations of the interchange fee in
terms of final pricing towards merchants and/ or cardholders.29
§3.04 OVERVIEW OF EU COMPETITION CASES IN RELATION TO CARD
PAYMENTS: THE INTERCHANGE FEE ‘SAGA’
The EC policy towards IFs has followed six consecutive ‘waves’. Whilst our report
seeks to evaluate the 2010 Visa Europe commitment decision, a brief summary of the
other decisions adopted by the EC helps apprehend the context of the decision and the
developmental path of competition policy towards IF. This section is likely to be of
most interest to law minded readers:
(1) July 2002 – Visa International negative clearance decision.30
(2) December 2007 – Mastercard infringement decision.31
(3) December 2010 – Visa Europe (debit card) commitment decision.32
(4) July 2014 – Visa Europe (credit card and cross-border acquiring) commitment
decision.33
(5) January 2019 – infringement decision against Mastercard in relation to
cross-border acquiring (also sometimes referred to as central acquiring).34
29. Alen Veljan, Regulating the Uncontrollable: The Development of Card Scheme Fees in Payments
Markets in Light of Recent Policy Intervention, 29 Res. in L. & Econ. (2020).
30. Commission Decision 2002/914/EC – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, supra n.
18.
31. Commission Decision 2009/C 264/04 of 19 December 2007, on Case COMP/34.579 — Master-
Card, Case COMP/36.518 — EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580 — Commercial Cards (notified
under document C(2007) 6474), OJ C 264, 6.11.2009.
Earlier that year the Commission had issued Commission Decision 2009/C 183/05 of 3
December on Case COMP/D1/37860 – Morgan Stanley/Visa International and Visa Europe
(notified under document C(2007) 4471), OJ C 183/6, 5.8.2009. That decision addressed the fact
that Visa Europe had refused to grant Morgan Stanley a license to participate in the Visa scheme
as acquirer due to the fact that Morgan Stanley was operating a competing card scheme in the
US, called Discover. And a few dates later, the EC adopted another decision in the payment
sectors involving the French domestic card scheme, GIE Cartes Bancaires (CB), and more
particular a fee called ‘MERFA’ that some CB members were required to pay to other CB
members (Commission Decision of 17 October 2007 on Case COMP/D1/38606 – groupement des
Cartes Bancaires ‘CB’). For the sake of (relative) brevity, we do not address those two decisions
in the report.
32. Commission Decision of 8 December 2010 on Case COMP/39.398 — VISA MIF (notified under
document C(2010) 8760 final). The commitments are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39398/39398_6186_3.pdf.
33. Commission Decision of 26 February 2014 on Case AT.39398 – VISA MIF (notified under
document C(2014) 1199 final). The commitments are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39398/39398_9729_3.pdf.
34. Commission Decision of 22 January 2019 on Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II (notified under
document C(2019) 241 final).
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(6) April 2019 – two commitment decisions against Visa Inc./ Visa International
and Mastercard in relation to inbound interregional transactions.35
[A] The Background to the EC’s Competition Law Enforcement
The history of the EC’s enforcement against card schemes started in 1977, when Visa
International notified its rules, including rules on IF, to the EC seeking prior approval
of its IF arrangement. At the time, business and economic organisations participating
in agreements with other firms could seek from the EC a negative clearance or, in the
alternative, an exemption from antitrust liability under Article 101 TFEU (at the time,
Article 81 EC). In 1985, the EC issued a comfort letter to Visa International. However,
a complaint by the British Retail Consortium (BRC) against Visa’s and Mastercard’s
default cross-border IFs in 1992 prompted the EC to re-open its investigation into Visa
International. The comfort letter was withdrawn later that year. Between 1992 and
1995, Mastercard also made various notifications to the EC in relation to various
schemes rules, including its IF arrangements.
In 1997, EuroCommerce lodged a competition law complaint against various
aspects of the Visa and Mastercard scheme rules. The complaint focused on a range of
issues including IFs but also the ‘honour all’ cards rule (HACR), the no-discrimination
rule (NDR), etc. EuroCommerce alleged that the IF paid by the acquirer to the issuer
was passed on by the acquirer to the merchant, thereby artificially inflating the level of
MSC. The MSC overcharge was then typically passed on by the merchant to their
customers (e.g., consumers) in the form of higher (retail) prices, ultimately resulting in
consumers having to pay for an allegedly ‘excessive’ level of IF.
35. Commission Decision of 29 April 2019 on Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II (notified under
document C(2019) 3033 final). The commitments are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39398/39398_14155_4.pdf. Commission Decision of 29
April 2019 on Case AT.39398 – Visa MIF (notified under document C(2019) 3034 final). The
commitments are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/
39398/39398_14155_4.pdf.
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The complainant wanted the EC to enforce its competition law powers to reduce
the IF paid by acquirers to issuers, ideally to zero in the expectation that (1) acquirers
would pass on to merchants this reduction of IF in the form of a lower MSC, and (2) in
turn merchants would pass-on the reduction of the MSC to consumers in the form of
lower retail prices. To that end, EuroCommerce argued before the EC that the IF was
akin to a price-fixing cartel:
the interchange fee as a mechanism to shift onto merchants (and indirectly onto
customers who pay by means other than Visa card) the costs of free advantages
offered to cardholders. Since the level of the fee is said to be agreed on between the
banks without any pressure from the market, the setting of the MIF amounts,
according to EuroCommerce, to a price-fixing cartel. EuroCommerce considers
that the MIF is not indispensable for the Visa scheme to function successfully, and
has provided examples of payment card schemes, which, it claims, function
without a MIF.36
In turn, EuroCommerce requested that the EC impose on Visa and Mastercard to
set the default Intra-EEA IF to zero. In 1999, the Commission launched proceedings
against Visa International.
[B] Visa International 2001: Negative Clearance Decision
In 2001, the EC left the issue of IF on the backburner and issued a negative clearance
decision covering the other rules contained in the Visa International scheme rules and
subject to the EuroCommerce complaint, such as the HACR,37 the NDR,38 territorial
licensing,39 modified rules on cross-border issuing and cross-border acquiring40 and
the No Acquiring Without Issuing (NAWI) rule.41 The EC concluded that those various
rules did not restrict competition and therefore did not fall foul of Article 101(1) TFEU
(previously, Article 81(1) EC); the only exception being the NDR which, according to
the EC, did restrict competition, but not to an appreciable extent and therefore did not
fall foul of Article 101(1) TFEU either.
36. Commission Decision 2002/914/EC – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, supra n.
18, at paras 27–28.
37. The Visa HACR required merchants to accept all valid Visa-branded cards, irrespective of the
identity of the issuer, the nature of the transaction and the type of card being issued.
38. The NDR prevented merchants from surcharging card transactions or discounting for cash
payments.
39. The licences granted by Visa International to issue cards or acquire transactions were granted
country-by-country.
40. Initially, the Visa International rules did not allow Visa member banks to issue cards to
cardholders outside their country of establishment or to acquire merchants in other Member
States, except in very limited circumstances. However, Visa International had significantly
increased the possibilities for cross-border issuing of Visa cards and cross-border acquiring of
Visa transactions. Following the latest amendments, Visa International allowed cross-border
issuing and cross-border acquiring without the prior establishment of a branch or subsidiary in
the country concerned.
41. The NAWI rule required a financial institution to first issue a significant number of Visa cards
before it would potentially be allowed to also acquire Visa transactions. This rule was there to
promote the development of the system by ensuring a large cardholder base, thereby making the
system more attractive for merchants.
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In December 2001, EuroCommerce started annulment proceedings against the EC
decision before the General Court (previously, the Court of First Instance),42 which it
later withdrew (the removal from the Court’s register happened in March 2003).43
Whilst there is no need to discuss further the EC 2001 decision since it did not
deal with IF, it is interesting to see that all the scheme rules under consideration were
either amended and/or abolished by the card schemes as part of the EC’s further
competition law enforcement, and/or further to EU legislation proposed by the EC.
This shows a clear evolution in the EC’s position in relation to those rules over the
years. For example:
– effective 1 January 2005, both Visa and Mastercard repealed their NAWI rule
in the EEA;
– effective 1 January 2005, Mastercard also abolished the NDR in the EEA. Visa
did not abolish that rule until EU legislation proposed by the EC, namely the
2007 Payment Services Directive (PSD1) allowed merchants to surcharge or
discount for the use of a given payment instrument (unless prohibited or
limited by each Member State’s national legislation);44
– following a request from the EC, Mastercard also introduced a new cross-
border acquiring license for its debit card ‘Maestro’. As will be described
below, the Visa and Mastercard rules on cross-border acquiring in particular
were later on subject to further enforcement (resulting in the Visa Europe 2010
and 2014 commitment decisions, and an infringement decision against Mas-
tercard in 2019 with a fine of approximately EUR 570 million);
– the 2015 IFR, as proposed by the EC in 2013, relaxed the HACR (more
specifically the so-called ‘honour all products’ aspect of the HACR therefore
allowing merchants to, for example, only accept Visa/Mastercard debit cards
but not Visa/Mastercard credit cards, etc.), and prohibited territorial licences
as well as any restrictions on cross-border issuing and cross-border acquiring.
[C] Visa International 2002 Exemption Decision
The EC position on IF became clearer in the course of events leading to the granting of
an exemption to Visa International in 2002. During the procedure, the EC hinted that
IFs could not be categorically deemed restrictive of competition, and that this was a
factual question requiring economic analysis.45
42. Case T-336/01, EuroCommerce A.I.S.B.L. v. Commission of European Communities [2001] C 84,
06.04.2002.
43. Case T-336/01, EuroCommerce A.I.S.B.L. v. Commission of European Communities [2001] C 146,
21.06.2003.
44. Article 52(3) of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC,
2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, OJ L 319,
5.12.2007, pp. 1–36.
45. In a supplementary statement of objections as summarised in its 2002 decision, the EC defined
the relevant markets, thereby hinting that an effects analysis was needed. The EC stated that the
Chapter 3: Payment Card Cases §3.04[C]
55
In its decision, the EC concluded that the default Intra-EEA IF was not ‘technically
necessary for the operation of the Visa payment scheme. […] The only provisions
necessary for the operation of the Visa four-party payment scheme, apart from technical
arrangements on message formats and the like, are the obligation of the creditor bank to
accept any payment validly entered into the system by a debtor bank and the prohibition
on (ex post) pricing by one bank to another.’46
As regards the restriction of competition, the EC concluded that:
64. […] the MIF has a restrictive effect on competition among Visa issuers and
among Visa acquirers. […]
67. […] Issuing banks are required to charge acquiring banks a certain fixed fee and
are therefore prevented from developing at wholesale level an individual pricing
policy vis-à-vis acquiring banks in so far as they provide services to them (for
example a ‘payment guarantee’ for most transactions).
68. The MIF moreover has as its effect to distort the behaviour of acquiring banks
vis-à-vis their customers (at resale level), because it creates an important cost
element (according to EuroCommerce on average approximately 80% of the
merchant fee) which is likely to constitute a de facto floor for the fees charged to
the merchants they acquire since otherwise, the acquiring bank would make a loss
on its acquiring activity.
69. However, the Commission does not consider the MIF agreement to be a
restriction of competition by object, since a MIF agreement in a four-party payment
system such as that of Visa has as its objective to increase the stability and efficiency
of operation of that system (see section 8.1.1 below), and indirectly to strengthen
competition between payment systems by thus allowing four-party systems to
compete more effectively with three-party systems.47
The EC held that the restrictive effect of the IF was enhanced by the implemen-
tation of other schemes rules and practices such as the HACR, the NDR and blended
MSCs agreed between acquirers and merchants (instead of ‘IF plus’ MSCs) which
hinder the merchants’ ability to manage their payment costs. The restrictions of
competition were appreciable and there was at least potentially an effect on trade
between Member States.
Turning to the question of whether the default cross-border IF could benefit from
an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU (previously, Article 81(3) EC), the EC
considered that a market analysis on a case-by-case basis was necessary:
As a preliminary remark, it is not the case that an agreement concerning prices is
always to be classified as a cartel and thus as inherently non-exemptible. Examples
exist of agreements on prices which can meet the conditions for an exemption.
relevant markets (to be considered as part of the breach related to Article 101(1) TFEU were: (1)
the markets for systems/networks where Visa International and Mastercard compete, as well
downstream markets, i.e., (2) the intra-system market on the issuing side (where card issuers
compete); and (3) the intra-system market on the acquiring side (where card acquirers
compete). The geographic scope, whilst historically national, was left open by the EC.
46. Commission Decision 2002/914/EC – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, supra n.
18, at paras 59–60.
47. Commission Decision 2002/914/EC – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, supra n.
18, at paras 64 and 67–69.
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Furthermore, a MIF is not a price charged to a consumer, but a remuneration paid
between banks who must deal with each other for the settlement of a card payment
transaction and thus have no choice of partner. The absence of some sort of default
rule on the terms of settlement could lead to abuse by the issuing bank, which is
in a position of monopsony as regards the acquiring bank for the settlement of an
individual payment transaction. Thus, some kind of default arrangement is
necessary, but the question of whether it qualifies for exemption or not will depend
on the details of the arrangement.48
In response, Visa International proposed a new (cost-based) methodology to
determine a maximum level for its Intra-EEA IF, as well as maximum amounts. The EC
found the proposed revisions to meet the conditions for an exemption.
Let us look closer at the changes introduced by Visa International. First, Visa
International committed to reducing its cross-border credit IF from approximately
1.1% to reach a weighted average of 0.7% by 2007. In addition, Visa International
committed to reducing its cross-border debit IF to a yearly weighted average of EUR
0.28 before the end of 2002. The average debit card transaction value in 2019 was EUR
57,49 meaning that the average debit IF accepted by the EC was almost 0.5%
Second, Visa International offered to introduce more objectivity in its Intra-EEA
IF setting. To that end, Visa International committed to set the default Intra-EEA IF by
sole reference to three costs components borne by issuers and that were considered by
EC as benefitting merchants, i.e. (1) the cost of processing transactions; (2) the cost of
providing the ‘payment guarantee’ to the merchant; and (3) the cost of the free-funding
period extended by the issuer to the cardholder (for transactions related to credit
cards).
Third, Visa International allowed acquirers to disclose the level of the IF and the
cost components used for calculating the IF cap to merchants.50
The exemption was valid until 31 December 2007.
[D] Mastercard 2007 Infringement Decision
Following the Visa International 2002 decision, Mastercard informed the Commission
in July 2003 of its intention to initiate proceedings against the EC under Article 232 EC
(failure to act), unless the EC took a formal position with respect to Mastercard’s
Intra-EEA fallback IF. The EC then issued two SOs (2003, 2006) and a letter of facts
(2007). There was no commitment in the Mastercard case – instead the EC reached an
infringement decision against Mastercard Incorporated, Mastercard International In-
corporated and Mastercard Europe SPRL (together Mastercard) in December 2007. The
main conclusions reached by the EC are summarised hereafter.
First, the definition of relevant market was identical to the Visa 2002 decision.
48. Commission Decision 2002/914/EC – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, supra n.
18, at para. 79.
49. European Central Bank – Statistical Data Warehouse (https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu).
50. After the Visa 2002 decision, both Visa and Mastercard agreed to publish their intra-European
cross-border interchange fees on their respective website (but not yet domestic IF).
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Second, the EC concluded that Mastercard remained an association of undertak-
ings subject to Article 101 TFEU (previously Article 81 EC). This conclusion was not a
given, because Mastercard had gone through an initial public offering (IPO) in May
2006 so that issuers and acquirers no longer had ownership and control over Master-
card and in particular were no longer involved in the process of determining the level
of the default Intra-EEA IF.
Third, since the Intra-EEA IF constituted an artificial, common de facto floor for
the MSC charged by acquirers to merchants, it had the effect of restricting competition
between acquirers; and that restrictive effect was appreciable and had at least a
potential effect on trade between Member States. The EC left open the possibility that
the Intra-EEA IF was a restriction of competition by object: ‘[…] given that it can be
clearly established that the MasterCard MIF has the effect of appreciably restricting and
distorting competition to the detriment of merchants in the acquiring markets it is not
necessary to reach a definite conclusion as to whether the MasterCard MIF is a restriction
by object […]’.51
Fourth, the Intra-EEA IF was not objectively necessary to the operation of the
Mastercard scheme and therefore could not be absolved as an ‘ancillary restriction’ of
competition. The scheme could function on the basis of the remuneration of issuers by
cardholders, and of acquirers by merchants. Unlike restrictions which are necessary for
implementing a main operation, restrictions which are merely desirable for the
commercial success of that operation, or which offer greater efficiency, can be
examined only within the framework of Article 101(3) EC.52
Fifth, Mastercard therefore had to demonstrate that the level of the Intra-EEA IF
met the conditions for an exemption under Article 101(3) EC. In the MEMO that
accompanied the EC decision, the EC stated that ‘The Commission sought to find an
agreement with MasterCard on an acceptable MIF. However, the modifications proposed
by MasterCard were not appropriate to bring its MIF in line with Article [101] 81 (3) of
the EC Treaty. The Commission therefore continued its investigation.’53 The EC con-
cluded in its decision that Mastercard had failed to demonstrate that its default
Intra-EEA IF met the conditions for exemption, and therefore that it was in breach of
Article 101 TFEU.54
51. Commission Decision on Case COMP/34.579—MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518—Euro
Commerce, Case COMP/38.580—Commercial Cards, supra n. 31, at para. 407.
52. Commission Decision on Case COMP/34.579—MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518—Euro
Commerce, Case COMP/38.580—Commercial Cards, supra n. 31, paras 526–527.
53. Antitrust: Commission prohibits MasterCard’s intra-EEA Multilateral Interchange Fees – fre-
quently asked questions, European Commission (19 December 2007), https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_07_590.
54. Note that the scope of the Mastercard 2007 decision was the same as the 2002 Visa International
decision, i.e., the default IF applicable to Intra-EEA transactions. The EC 2007 decision states
that it concerns the Mastercard default Intra-EEA IF as it applies not only to Intra-EEA
transactions, but also to domestic transactions in a number of EEA Member States. However, in
practice, and contrary to what the EC stated in its 2007 decision and its contemporaneous press
release, by the time the EC decision was adopted in December 2007 the Mastercard-set default
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Mastercard nonetheless benefited from an immunity from fines because it had
notified its IF arrangements to the EC between 1992 and 1997. However, the EC
requested that Mastercard brought the infringement to an end within six months of the
notification of the decision, on threat of a daily penalty payment of 3.5% of Master-
card’s daily consolidated global turnover in the preceding business year, which
represented approximately USD 450,000 per day.
In the absence of guidance from the EC as to what level of default Intra-EEA IF it
would consider exemptible, Mastercard first reduced the Intra-EEA IF to zero in June
2008.55 Mastercard and the EC then started a dialogue as to the level of default
Intra-EEA IF that the EC would consider exemptible. The EC requested that the IF be set
on the basis of the tourist test methodology, which was later renamed and referred to
as the MIT. The test seeks to set the IF at a level at which merchants are indifferent as
to whether a payment is made by a card or by cash.56 The discussions between the EC
and Mastercard resulted in Mastercard offering ‘Unilateral Undertakings’ to the EC in
2009,57 including a weighted average default Intra-EEA IF level of 0.2% for debit and
prepaid cards and 0.3% for credit cards. Those levels became the benchmarks for the
future EC competition law enforcement (see below) as well as the enforcement by most
(but not all) NCAs, as well as the levels that were proposed by the EC in the draft IFR
that it published in July 2013 (and, which became applicable in December 2015 as far
as IF are concerned).
In the meantime, Mastercard had appealed the EC’s 2007 decision to the General
Court, but the General Court upheld the EC’s decision in its entirety in 2012.
Mastercard then appealed the EC 2007 decision, as confirmed by the General Court, to
the Court of Justice, which again upheld the EC’s 2007 decision in its entirety in 2014.58
The Courts upheld in particular the EC’s finding that despite its 2006 IPO, Mastercard
remained an association of undertakings because (1) the banks had retained certain
decision-making powers on some key issues and (2) Mastercard, issuers, acquirers and
Mastercard’s new shareholders all had an interest in a high default Intra-EEA IF. The
Intra-EEA IF did not apply to domestic transactions in any EEA Member State; therefore, the
practical scope of the decision was the same as the Visa 2002 decision: only Intra-EEA
transactions.
55. Antitrust: Commission notes MasterCard’s decision to temporarily repeal its cross-border Multi-
lateral Interchange Fees within the EEA, European Commission (12 June 2008), https://ec.
europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_08_397.
56. Despite para. 38 of the Visa 2001 decision: ‘The costs of accepting cash are largely administrative
costs, and hard to compare with the cost of accepting cards.’
57. Antitrust: Commissioner Kroes takes note of MasterCard’s decision to cut cross-border Multilat-
eral Interchange Fees (MIFs) and to repeal recent scheme fee increases, European Commission (1
April 2009), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_09_515; Antitrust:
Commissioner Kroes notes MasterCard’s decision to cut cross-border Multilateral Interchange Fees
(MIFs) and to repeal recent scheme fee increases – frequently asked questions, European
Commission (1 April 2009), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_
09_143.
58. Anecdotally, the hearing in the Court of Justice took place on 4th July, and the judgment was
rendered on 9/11 (on the same day as the judgment in the Cartes Bancaires case – C-67/13 P),
which are obviously dates that can make a US company wonder if the choice of dates by the
Court is entirely accidental … .
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Courts also upheld the existence of a restriction of competition by effect and the
absence of objective necessity of the default Intra-EEA IF.
The EC’s 2007 decision, as upheld by the EU Courts, is the decision that a number
of merchants have relied upon since 2012 to seek damages from Mastercard and Visa
as part of ongoing follow-on litigations, primarily (but not solely) in United Kingdom
(UK) Courts. It also forms the basis for a consumer class action that is currently ongoing
in the UK against Mastercard for an amount of GBP 14 billion.59
[E] December 2010: Visa Europe (Debit Card) Commitments
After the Mastercard 2007 decision, the EC ‘turned back’ once again to Visa. In 2009,
the EC issued a Statement of Objections (SO) against Visa Europe, which based on the
statements in the 2010 Visa Europe commitment decision, found that: (1) the relevant
market in scope was the market for card acquiring services, and that those markets
were still to be regarded as national; (2) Visa remained an association of undertakings
(unlike Mastercard, Visa Europe was still owned and controlled by issuers and
acquirers, so this qualification was not contested by Visa Europe); (3) Visa Europe’s
default debit IF, both for Intra-EEA as well as domestic debit card transactions in EEA
Member States, restricted competition by object and effect; (4) those default IF were not
objectively necessarily to the operation of the Visa Europe scheme; (5) they were
capable of appreciably and negatively affecting cross-border trade between EEA
Member States and; (6) Visa Europe had not demonstrated that the conditions for an
exemption were met which, whilst not specifically addressed in the commitments
decision, implicitly means that the EC no longer considered the levels of default debit
card cross-border IF set out in the 2002 Visa International decision exemptible
(presumably the EC was of the view that only the 0.2% weighted average applied by
Mastercard since 2009 was exemptible).
Like Visa International earlier, Visa Europe offered commitments to the EC that
were made binding in an EC decision dated 8 December 2010. Visa Europe committed
to reducing the debit/prepaid Intra-EEA IF to 0.2% weighted average as it applied to
cross-border transactions (thereby ensuring a level playing field with the Mastercard
2009 Unilateral Undertakings as far as debit/prepaid cards are concerned) but also
potentially to domestic transactions in some EEA countries (although that was not the
case in practice).
However, Visa Europe also committed to reducing to the same level debit IF
applicable to domestic transactions in nine EEA countries where Visa Europe was in
charge of setting the default domestic debit IF at the time.60 This was a new approach
since the EC had never before requested Visa Europe or Mastercard to reduce the levels
59. See, e.g., Kristin Ridley, UK Supreme Court Enables $18.5 Billion Class Action Against Master-
card, Reuters (21 December 2020, 11:38 am) https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-
mastercard-court/uk-supreme-court-enables-18-5-billion-class-action-against-mastercard-idUS
KBN28L16J.
60. Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Sweden, Luxembourg, Netherlands (in the last
two countries, only Visa prepaid cards were issued by then – no Visa debit cards).
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of domestic IF (it had left the issue of domestic IF entirely to NCAs). The EC reported
that this represented a reduction of about 60% on average.61 Visa Europe also
committed to a few other measures reflecting what Mastercard had offered in its 2009
Unilateral Undertakings; however, we refrain from addressing those in detail here. The
commitments were applicable for a period of four years from the notification of the
decision (i.e., until approximately December 2014).
Interestingly, Visa Europe subsequently requested the EC to amend (i.e., to
increase) the level of the above debit card IF caps that it had committed to, but the EC
rejected Visa Europe’s request by its decision of 31 July 2012. Visa Europe initially
sought the annulment of that EC decision before the General Court on 10 October 2012.
It would appear from the main pleas and arguments62 that Visa Europe had submitted
an economic study that resulted in higher levels of debit IF on the basis of the tourist
test or MIT than the 0.2% weighted average that it had committed to – and, as a result,
it sought an increase of those levels; which the EC refused. Visa Europe eventually
discontinued its appeal in March 2014.63
[F] February 2014: Visa Europe Commitments
In July 2012, the EC issued a supplementary SO against Visa Europe in relation to its
default credit IF, as well as its rules on which IF applies to domestic transactions that
are processed by an acquirer located in another EEA country than the country where
the merchant and issuer and located (i.e., cross-border acquired transaction). The SO
apparently stated that: (1) Visa Europe was an association of undertakings (again, this
was not disputed by Visa Europe); (2) its default cross-border and domestic credit card
IF restricted competition by object and effect; same for the Visa Europe rule that stated
that a cross-border acquirer should pay the IF of the country where the merchant and
the issuer are located (it is not clear from the EC decision what the counterfactual is);
(3) those default credit IF and the rule determining which IF should apply to a
cross-border acquired transaction were not objectively necessary to the operation of
the Visa Europe scheme; (4) whilst not specifically addressed in the commitment
decision, implicitly it is clear that the EC no longer considered the level of default credit
cross-border IF set out in the 2002 Visa International decision (i.e., 0.7%) exemptible.
Visa Europe offered commitments to the EC, which were made binding in an EC
commitment decision dated 26 February 2014. As part of those commitments, Visa
Europe agreed essentially to the following (in chronological order).
First, Visa Europe committed to reducing its default Intra-EEA credit IF to a
weighted average of 0.3% (i.e., the same level applied by Mastercard since its 2009
‘Unilateral Undertakings’, therefore ensuring a level playing field between the two
competing schemes in relation to cross-border credit transactions).
61. Antitrust: Vice President Almunia welcomes Visa Europe’s proposal to cut interbank fees for debit
cards, European Commission (26 April 2010), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
detail/en/IP_10_462.
62. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012TN0447.
63. Case T-447/12 Visa Europe Ltd and Others v. Commission, 30.4.2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:247.
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Second, as of 1 January 2015, Visa Europe committed to a rule change in relation
to cross-border acquiring. In the 2010 (debit card) commitment decision, Visa Europe
had committed ‘to continue to require Visa Europe members to register all MIF rates and
apply them to cross-border issued and cross-border acquired transactions’ – i.e., the
domestic IF of the country of the merchant/ issuer should apply to domestic transac-
tions irrespective of whether the acquirer is a local/ domestic acquirer or a foreign/
cross-border acquirer.64 Visa Europe committed to a change: in the case where a
merchant relied on a cross-border acquirer, the applicable IF would be either the
domestic IF of the country of the merchant/ issuer (as was the case until now) or
0.2%0.3% (knowing that, in practice, the latter would almost always be lower). This
commitment was meant to encourage merchants to get connected to acquirers in other
EEA countries than their own.
Third, as of 1 January 2015, Visa Europe accepted a reduction of the (credit and
debit) IF paid by the acquirer of an EEA merchant to an issuer located in some select
non-EEA countries (including Switzerland, Turkey and Israel), therefore giving the
commitment decision a form of extra-territorial effect outside of the EEA.
Fourth, Visa Europe adopted a few other measures, including some that never
became effective in practice with the IFR superseding them as from December 2015,
including a reduction by Visa Europe of default domestic credit IF in ten EEA countries
where Visa Europe set the rates (as opposed to local issuers or acquirers (either
bilaterally or multilaterally) that should have happened approximately around Febru-
ary 2016.
The duration of commitments was four years from the notification of the decision
(i.e., approximately December 2014).
[G] January 2019: Mastercard II Infringement Decision (Cross-Border
Acquiring)
We saw above that in the EC commitment decision dated 26 February 2014, Visa
Europe had given a commitment to the EC that allowed merchants to use an acquirer
located in another country (i.e., a cross-border acquirer) and pay cross-border IF of
0.2%/0.3% which was lower than most domestic IF, therefore allowing merchants to
normally pay lower IF as part of their MSC. Since Mastercard did not pro-actively offer
the same commitment to the EC (despite the fact that the issue was going to be
regulated by the, then, forthcoming IFR), in July 2015 the EC issued a SO to Mastercard
which, based on the ultimate fining decision, apparently stated as follows, in summary.
64. ‘The Commission’s concern that certain cross-border acquirers could be foreclosed from
competition with local acquirers due to different MIF rates applicable to the two groups has,
however, been removed by the mandatory registration and application of domestic MIFs agreed
by local acquirers. As regards the obligation for a cross- border acquirer to pay the MIF of the
place of the transaction, the Commission has not investigated that point fully and reserves its
right to investigate it further in the future.’ Commission Decision on Case AT.39398 – VISA MIF,
supra n. 33, at para. 49.
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First, despite its 2006 IPO, Mastercard remained an association of undertakings in
relation to its scheme rules on cross-border acquiring65
Second, ‘Mastercard’s cross-border acquiring rules meant that acquirers offering
card payment transaction acquiring services in Member States where the domestic MIFs
were lower were prevented from seeking to offer cheaper services based on the MIFs in
their “home” countries in Member States where the domestic MIFs were higher. The
merchants were also prevented from taking advantage of the internal market and
benefiting from less expensive services from card acquirers established in low-MIF
Member States. Therefore, the Commission concludes that Mastercard’s cross-border
acquiring rules created an obstacle to cross-border trade in the market for acquiring card
payment transactions in the EEA. The rules shielded national markets from cross-border
competition from acquirers established in other Member States. The rules reveal in
themselves, and by their very nature, a sufficient degree of harm to competition to be
considered a restriction of competition “by object”.’66
Third, the infringement period was 27 February 2014 (i.e., the day after the
adoption of the Visa Europe commitment decision on inter alia cross-border acquiring)
to 8 December 2015 (i.e., the day before the relevant IFR provisions became appli-
cable). ‘At least with the adoption of the Commission’s 2014 Visa Europe Decision,
Mastercard was aware, or should have been aware, that the cross-border acquiring Rules
infringed the competition rules and it was reasonably foreseeable for Mastercard that it
should be held responsible for an infringement if it continued to apply its cross-border
acquiring rules. The Commission therefore concludes that as of that point in time
Mastercard commitments an infringement intentionally, or at least negligently.’67
After having responded to the SO, Mastercard submitted a formal offer of
cooperation to the Commission (‘Settlement Submission’) in December 2018, in which
it acknowledged in particular the breach of Article 101 TFEU. As a result, on 22 January
2019, the EC adopted an infringement decision against Mastercard imposing a fine of
EUR 570,566,000 on Mastercard.68
[H] April 2019: Visa International and Mastercard Commitments on
Inbound Interregional IF
In parallel to the above, the EC had opened investigations against Visa Inc. and Visa
International Services Association (together Visa International), as well as three
65. Interestingly enough, the justification for Mastercard remaining an association is slightly
different than in the January 2019 fining decision adopted just three months earlier. In the April
2019 Mastercard commitment decision, the EC relied on the two criteria as confirmed by the EU
courts on appeal of the EC 2007 decision – whereas, as mentioned above, three months earlier,
in January 2019 fining decision, the EC referred to Mastercard ‘listening to its customers/ the
market’, etc.
66. Commission Decision on Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II, supra n. 34, at paras 62–63.
67. Commission Decision on Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II, supra n. 34, at para. 94.
68. Interestingly, consumer prepaid cards are not covered by the decision (see para. 22 of EC
decision), unlike all previous, and future, EC competition enforcement that always treated
consumer debit and prepaid together.
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Mastercard legal entities (together Mastercard) in relation to the default IF applicable to
inbound interregional transactions, i.e., transactions where the card issuer is located
outside of the EEA and the merchant is located within the EEA. In essence, these
investigations can be seen as complements to the IFR that had become applicable (in
part) on 9 December 2015. Indeed, the IF caps set in the IFR only apply to transactions
where the issuer, as well as the acquirer and the merchant, are located within the EEA
– but not to inbound interregional transactions.
The EC issued several SOs against Visa International (in 2009, 2013 and 2017)
and one SO against Mastercard (in 2015). The main allegations are as follows. First,
Visa International and Mastercard, despite their respective IPOs, remain associations of
undertakings as the two conditions mentioned in the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) 2014 Mastercard judgment were met, i.e. (1) issuers and acquirers
retained important decision-making powers in respect of essential aspects of the
operation of the scheme; and (2) the existence of a commonality of interest between the
scheme and issuers/acquirers on the issue of IF (read: a commonality of interest in a
‘high’ default IF).
Second, the interregional IF ‘amount to horizontal price-fixing […] Such price
fixing is by its very nature harmful to competition and reveals in itself a sufficient
degree of harm to competition to be considered a restriction of competition “by
object”.’69 The Visa and Mastercard inbound interregional IF are not objectively
necessary to the operation of the Visa and Mastercard schemes.
Third, The Visa and Mastercard inbound interregional IF did not meet the
conditions for an exemption.
Visa International and Mastercard both offered commitments to the EC. Both
schemes proposed to reduce the default IF applicable to inbound interregional trans-
actions. The EC accepted the commitments and made them binding in two decisions
dated 29 April 2019. More specifically, Visa International and Mastercard both gave
identical commitments, including reductions of IF for:
– card-present (CP) transactions: the same level of IF as those applicable under
the IFR since December 2015, i.e., 0.2% for consumer debit/ prepaid, 0.3% for
consumer credit;
– card-not-present (CNP) transactions (e.g., online transactions): 1.15% for
consumer debit/ prepaid and 1.50% for consumer credit. Those higher levels
had generated critical comments from merchants and merchant associations
during their market testing, but the EC accepted those levels and, in its press
release, justified those higher levels as follows: ‘[…] the Commission con-
cluded that, with the proposed inter-regional MIFs caps, the cost for retailers of
accepting inter-regional consumer card payments does not exceed the cost of
accepting alternative means for such payments, such as cash for Card Present
Transactions and e-wallets (digital wallets) funded via bank transfers for Card
Not Present Transactions’. Reading between the lines, it would appear that the
69. Commission Decision of 29 April 2019 on Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II, supra n. 35, para. 33.
Commission Decision of 29 April 2019 on Case AT.39398 – Visa MIF, supra n. 35, para. 34.
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costs imposed by digital wallets, perhaps such as Paypal, to EEA-based
merchants played a role in the EC accepting that the MIT resulted in higher
levels of IF than the usual 0.2%/ 0.3%.
The commitments are valid for a period of, effectively, five years – which,
depending on when the decisions were formally notified to Visa International and
Mastercard, we expect to be approximately until May 2024. These two decisions mark
the second time that the EC obtained commitments with an extra-territorial effect. The
first time, as mentioned above, was in the Visa Europe 2014 commitments.
§3.05 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data set consists of 10,072 valid points, associated with twenty-one different
variables. A total of twenty-seven Member States of the EU is covered over a time span
of twenty years (2000–2019). The data is collected on an annual basis and all absolute
variables are transformed into relative variables (per capita for instance) in order to
reduce the impact of outliers and achieve a higher degree of normalisation with regard
to distribution.70 In addition to the two main data sources, namely the European
Central Bank’s (ECB) statistical data warehouse (https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu) and
Eurostat’s statistical database (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database), IF are
obtained from Veljan (2018).71 A total of five outcome variables is tested. In addition to
the descriptive variables Country and Year as well as the dummy variables required to
conduct the DiD analysis (Treatment period; Treated market; Treatment period and
Treated market), a mixture of nine control variables is considered for the analysis. The
main driver behind the selected variables is in fact the rationale presented by the EC in
relation to a market intervention. A competition enforcement (and ultimately regula-
tion) is expected to lower the fees of card acceptance for merchants and thus drive
higher merchant acceptance whilst passing a substantial amount of savings on to
cardholders in form of lower prices. The increased acceptance is expected to drive






Number of total card payments per capita 2000–2019
70. Outliers are not subsequently removed; data is not normalised further; in cases of missing values
these are not replaced.
71. Alan Veljan, A Critical Review of the European Commission’s Multilateral Interchange Fee
Regulation, 12(3) J. Payments Strategy & Systems (2018).
72. Survey on merchants’ costs of processing cash and card payments, European Commission (March
2015), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/dgcomp_final_report_en.
pdf; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange fees
for card-based payment transactions, European Commission (24 July 2013), https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A52013PC0550.





Size (by value) Value of total card payments per capita [¤] 2000–2019
Acceptance Number of terminals installed per 1 million
inhabitants
2000–2019
Issuance Number of cards issued per capita 2000–2019
Displacement Number of ATM cash withdrawals per capita 2000–2019
Due to the aforementioned characteristics of card payment markets and the ineffec-
tiveness of assessing a single cost element in isolation, we deliberately depart from a
monetary and one-sided analysis and focus on metrics that act as proxies for the
success and efficiency of the network as a whole. We assume that increases in overall
market size in terms of transaction numbers and volumes, as well as market partici-
pants (merchants on the acceptance and cardholders on the issuance side) and a
displacement of cash are deemed favourable by the network participants. Further and
disregarding the cost structure of card payments, electronic payments are regarded to
be socially efficient and welfare optimising.73 Based on these two premises, above
variables can be utilised to assess the causal effects of the competition enforcement




Productivity Compensation of employees [¤/ hour]74 2004–2015
Poverty People at risk of poverty or social exclusion [%] 2004–2015
Internet Share of households with broadband access [%] 2004–2015
ATM Number of ATMs installed per 1 million
inhabitants
2000–2019
Inflation Harmonised index of consumer prices [%] 2000–2019
Interchange Weighted average interchange fee [%] 2007–2015
GDP Gross Domestic Product per capita [¤] 2000–2019
eCommerce Online purchases made by individuals in the last 3
months [%]
2004–2015
Tourism Nights spent at tourist accommodations [per
capita]
2000–2019
The selection of control variables represents the degree of digitalisation within a
country, the economic performance, stability and welfare distribution as well as access
to banking and payment products. Whilst numerous initiatives have driven a harmoni-
sation of the European card payment market, prevalent differences between the
73. Proposal for a Regulation on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, supra n. 72.
74. Under consideration of purchasing-power-parity.
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countries continue to exist. The selection of variables aims at identifying and control-
ling for these within the analysis.
We focus our analysis on the EC competition enforcement that led to the Visa
Europe 2010 commitment decision. The period analysed spans from 2004 to 2015, with
the exclusion of 2010 as this year can neither be classified as pre- nor post-
enforcement.75 The infringement period covers the years 2004–2009; the post-
intervention period ranges from 2011 to 2015. Further, any confounding effects
stemming from previous cases (34,579: Mastercard 2007) or the IFR can be minimised.
Whilst the Mastercard 2007 case only applied to Intra-EEA76 card transactions that, at
the time, accounted for less than 5% of total card transactions across Europe,77 the IFR
came into effect on 9 December 2015 and should thus have not had any major impacts
on the data either. The only remaining antitrust enforcement relates to Visa Europe’s
Intra-EEA and domestic fallback credit IF, which were amended on 14 May 2013.
However, at this point in time, only a fraction (23%) of European card transactions are
completed using credit cards.78
During this period data availability is warranted for all countries; the variable
interchange represents an exception. As part of the enforcement, the debit interchange
fee was amended for all Intra-EEA card transactions within the EEA. The enforcement
also applied to countries where Visa Europe was in charge of setting the domestic debit
interchange fee. At this point in time, Visa Europe set the domestic debit interchange
fee in Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Sweden, Luxembourg and
Netherlands. As these countries would have experienced a far greater impact of the
enforcement, they are classified as the treated group, with all remaining countries
representing the control group. This way cross-country variations can be exploited to
provide insights into the effects of antitrust involvement.
In its simplest form, the DiD approach calculates the difference between the
infringement and post-intervention periods for an outcome variable within the treated
group and compares this with the obtained results for the same outcome variable
within the control group, thereby enabling an assessment of the impacts.79 The
underlying methodology is a linear regression (OLS);80 in our case conducted with the
Enter method within the program SPSS. Initially all input variables81 are selected and
75. On 26 April 2010 Visa agreed to trial the proposed interchange rate (0.2%) for debit card
payments. On 8 December 2010 the EC makes Visa’s commitments legally binding.
76. Intra-EEA transactions are transactions initiated with a card issued in country A within the EEA
and utilised in country B. Card issuer and merchant are located in different countries but both
within the EEA.
77. Commission Decision 2009/C 264/04 on Case COMP/34.579—MasterCard, Case
COMP/36.518—EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580—Commercial Cards, supra n. 31.
78. European Central Bank – Statistical Data Warehouse (https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu).
79. A total of 5 regression analyses are run for the outcome variables. Additionally, 5 analyses are
run to test the common trend hypothesis.
80. Ordinary Least Squares.
81. The analysis is run for the five selected output variables separately. In order to assess the main
drivers of the movement in any outcome variable we also test the output variables’ impact, i.e.,
initially select them as an input variable in each run. The rationale behind this can be
exemplified as follows. For the outcome variable size (by number), we also test Acceptance and
Issuance as input variables in order to evaluate if changes in the output variable are driven more
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subsequently removed stepwise based on their significance. Significance is assessed
via the t-test value and a confidence level of 95% is defined. In order to control for
collinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is always kept below §3.05[E]. The
behaviour of the outcome variable prior to the intervention needs to be assessed in
order to establish a potential common trend. The common trend hypothesis can be
accepted if the variable of interest is not statistically significant, i.e., different from
zero. The significance of the enforcement can be visually interpreted and statistically
assessed so as to complement the causal interpretation. For the sake of robustness, a
separate analysis has been run whereby the pre-treatment period is extended by four
years to cover the timespan 2000–2009. The results of this analysis do not yield
significantly different results.
§3.06 RESULTS
The three variables Size (by number/ value) and Acceptance vary significantly across
Europe. On the contrary, Issuance and Displacement exhibit a comparatively lower
standard deviation. Both Size metrics are characterised by a positive/ right-skewed
distribution, whereas Acceptance, Issuance and Displacement have a relatively sym-
metric distribution. A constant growth can be recorded for all outcome variables across
the years (including infringement phase), except for Displacement which has remained
relatively stagnant. This in itself requires a more profound investigation in order to
enable an assessment if and to what extent the development of these variables was
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by the merchant or cardholder side. We acknowledge the complexities this endogeneity problem
can cause, especially in terms of establishing causality. However, this assessment is deemed
essential for our analysis and is a prevalent problem within two-sided markets.
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.020 .001 .887 14.984 .000
Treatment period 1.987 4.984 .016 .399 .691




16.346 7.701 .088 2.122 .035
a. Dependent Variable: Number of total card payments [per capita].
The findings show that the number of card payments per capita has significantly
increased (by an average of 16 payments) as a result of competition enforcement. Given
that the mean (median) lies at 73 (49) payments per capita, this results in a 22% uplift.
The model has a relatively strong explanatory power, characterised by a coefficient of
determination of 0.843. Also, we can confirm a common trend in the development of
the variable prior to the event date (2010).82 A visual assessment of the trend confirms
above findings. Whilst the treated and control groups exhibit a common trend prior to
the competition enforcement in 2010, a discrepancy in developments is observable
82. The analysed coefficient was significant at the 95% confidence level so that a common trend
cannot be assumed per se. However, although there was a significant divergence between the
trends in the number of card payments per capita for the treated and control groups prior to the
competition enforcement, this divergence was very small and close to zero (-0.005) so that the
common trend assumption is (presumably) satisfied.
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subsequently. A partial impact by the 2007 Mastercard decision, whereby a reduction
of the Mastercard Intra-EEA IF to zero in April 2008 was followed by an increase to
0.2% for debit and 0.3% for credit cards as of July 2009, cannot be excluded. Also, it
is observable that the positive trend was further amplified by the IFR which came into
force on 9 December 2015. We can confirm a positive, statistically significant relation-
ship between the size of the European card payment market (measured by number of
transactions) and the EC’s market intervention.
The majority of above findings hold for the second variable to be assessed,
namely Size (by value). Logically, one can assume that these two metrics will follow a
similar trend as an increase in the number of transactions will, ceteris paribus, lead to
an increase in card volume. However, whilst the number of total card payments is an
evident proxy for payment card utilisation, card volumes can be impacted by con-
founding factors such as wealth, spending behaviour or other macroeconomic devel-
opments. A risk of misinterpretation is especially prevalent when analysing monetary
values. In our model, we have tried to control for this by including control variables
such as productivity (Compensation of employees under consideration of payment
service providers (PPS)) or GDP per capita. The final model (shown below) only
contains the aforementioned variable due to its comparatively higher explanatory
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−9.401 7.791 −.031 −1.207 .229
Treatment period 302.060 211.494 .049 1.428 .154




−550.065 257.737 −.063 −2.134 .034
a. Dependent Variable: Value of total card payments [per capita].
The model exhibits even stronger goodness of fit and is able to explain 91% of the total
variance. Similarly, our findings show that the value of card payments is mainly driven
by the number of card payments and vice versa. However, whilst the above results hint
towards a positive impact of competition enforcement, the opposite is true with regard
to the Size (by value). In fact, the average cardholder spending has decreased by
approximately EUR 550 annually subsequent to the market intervention. In compari-
son to the mean of EUR 3,469, this is equivalent to a reduction of 16%. This
inconsistency can potentially be explained by the macroeconomic occurrences that
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have shaped the economy during the intervention period. The financial crisis and the
subsequent credit crunch started in 2007 in the United States (US) and spilt over to
Europe in late 2009. With increasing debt-to-GDP ratios and unemployment as well as
significant drops in GDP and productivity rates, the overall spending had been
impacted, which will – to a large degree – have impacted card spending as well.83
The above graph shows that whilst the growth momentum has continued for
both the treated and control groups (driven by the other explanatory variables, rather
than the policy intervention) subsequent to the downturn in 2009, the slope of the
control group has increased, i.e., it has become steeper especially in the period
between 2010 and 2015, whereas the slope for the treated markets has decreased, i.e.,
flattened, thereby resulting in a slower growth post-intervention. This is only the case
between 2010 and 2015 which is the analysed period. Afterwards, and certainly post-
IFR, the slope steepens significantly for the treated group whereas it remains relatively
constant for the control group. A common trend between the control and treated
groups cannot be confirmed for the infringement period.
The following two variables (Issuance and Acceptance) aim to assess in further
detail the drivers of above findings. We look at whether the size of the network has
increased and card payments are utilised in larger numbers and more often post-
intervention. We seek to understand if this is driven either by an increased card
issuance, by an increase in card acceptance, or by a mixture of both.
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.225 .070 .141 3.212 .001
a. Dependent Variable: Number of cards issued [per capita].
The results obtained for the variable Issuance display a significant, positive impact of
the market intervention on the number of cards issued per capita. Recall that a common
belief was that card issuance would decrease as issuers would be less incentivised to
invest in cards due to decreasing revenues stemming from a lower IF. In addition, it
was also believed that increases in annual card fees or reductions in rewards programs
would cause a deterioration in card payments. Our analysis suggests that the opposite
is in fact the case. Card issuance has continued to grow, and growth has actually been
amplified by the EC antitrust intervention. Although this could have manifold reasons,
according to our model it is driven mainly by the emergence and growth of eCommerce
and online purchases as well as continued card usage in relation to ATM withdrawals.
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The fact that several European countries continue to rely on domestic (debit) card
schemes for domestic transactions (e.g., Cartes Bancaires in France, Bancontact in
Belgium, Girocard in Germany, PagoBancomat in Italy, Multibanco in Portugal,
Dankort in Denmark, BankAxept in Norway), rather than Visa and Mastercard shall not
be disregarded.84 The model’s overall goodness of fit is relatively strong with an R2 of
0.784. On average an increased issuance of 0.225 cards can be recorded for the
post-intervention period. This equates to an increase of 16% when compared to the
average (mean) of 1.44 cards per capita.
A visual representation of our results confirms our interpretation. A common
trend prior to the event date can be observed and statistically confirmed. During the
post-intervention phase, the slope for control markets flattens and even stagnates for a
period, whilst a continued growth momentum can be observed for the treated group.
A further anomaly is the slight dip in 2016 which may in fact be somewhat related to
the IFR. However, this is overturned in 2017 where the growth is actually highest
across all years. We can confirm that the increase in card payments has been (to a large
extent) driven by an increase in average cardholding. From the set of outcome
variables, Acceptance is the only one where a statistically significant impact of the
intervention is not observable. Thus, we can conclude that Issuance has been the major
84. For a number of European economies, domestic debit card schemes continue to play a dominant
role in terms of payment but also cash withdrawals. Visa and Mastercard hold a marginal share
related to debit card circulation in several markets including Belgium (0%), Norway (0%),
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(Constant) 8.691 1.431 6.073 .000
Number of ATMs installed [per
1m inhabitants]
.000 .000 .260 4.233 .000
Number of total card payments
[per capita]
.068 .011 .408 6.262 .000
Compensation of employees
under consideration of PPS [¤/
hour]
−.553 .095 −.410 −5.825 .000
Number of cards issued [per
capita]
8.282 1.383 .460 5.989 .000
Nights spent at tourist
accommodations [per capita]
1.589 .461 .181 3.451 .001
Treatment period −1.791 1.079 −.087 −1.660 .098
Treated market −.845 1.399 −.038 −.604 .546
Treatment period and treated
market apply
−3.811 1.892 −.130 −2.014 .045
a. Dependent Variable: Number of ATM cash withdrawals [per capita].
Finally, we try to assess whether we can see a displacement of cash usage in exchange
for more sophisticated, electronic payment methods (including card payments). Our
regression model is characterised by a medium goodness of fit, explaining 51% of total
variance. A statistically significant, negative impact is observable with regard to the
number of ATM cash withdrawals per capita, resulting in an average decrease of four
withdrawals across the treated group. Considering an average (mean) cash withdrawal
of twenty-three, this results in a decrease of 17%. Further, cash usage seems to be
positively related to the number of cards in circulation and the total number of
payments, whereas an inversed relationship is observable with the productivity ratios
within the market. This is in line with common belief that the level of productivity as
well as other aspects of innovation and technological affinity will impact cash versus
electronic payment usage. A common trend during the pre-intervention period is also
observable and statistically confirmed.85
85. To reiterate in case of confusion: whilst the graphic depiction ranges from 2000–2019 to as to
provide a longer-term view of the development of the metrics, the analysed period is defined
from 2004–2015.
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§3.07 DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC FINDINGS
The focus of research in this paper differs from existing ex post impact assessments in
relation to the IF. The vast majority of previous research,86 including the EC’s study on
the application of the IFR,87 predominantly focus on monetary redistribution effects,
thereby aiming to assess the total impacts on the network, whilst facing the problem of
limited empirical data for all market participants, in order to conduct a final interpre-
tation. This problem is especially prevalent in two-sided markets as pass-through and
pricing elasticity of participants becomes key. As a result, most research lacks a holistic
assessment of the market or aims to bypass the problem with the usage of proxies or
interviews; all of which are suboptimal and can in fact lead to detrimental policy
decisions.88 We deliberately depart from this approach and try to assess the impacts of
antitrust intervention based on a set of metrics that represent overall network success.
In this respect, our ambition is more in the line with traditional multisided market
literature, which focuses on establishing functional relationships between price struc-
tures and output, leaving aside distributional concerns.
86. See David S. Evans, Howard H. Chang, and Steven Joyce, The Impact of the U.S. Debit-Card
Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare, 11(1) J. Competition L. & Econ. (2013); A
Veljan and A Roaidi, An Event Study Analysis of the Impacts of the European Interchange Fee
Regulation, 17(1) J. Competition L. & Econ. (2021).
87. Study on the application of the Interchange Fee Regulation, European Commission (11 March
2020) https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0120161enn.pdf.
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Importantly, our analysis also operates on the assumption that card payments
increase social welfare in comparison to non-digital payments such as cash. Put
differently, we postulate that a larger utilisation of the service, driven by a mixture of
increased merchant acceptance and/or cardholding, as well as an ultimate displace-
ment of cash payments is beneficial. We ground this assumption on the widely
documented inefficiencies and risks related to cash payments89 but also on the overall
digital finance strategy by the EC which includes payment services.90
Given the above, and from the perspective of overall market output, our results
are supportive of the policy expressed in enforcement initiatives like the Visa 2010
decision. The hypothesis can only be partially confirmed as the variables Size (by
number), Issuance and Displacement are significantly and positively impacted,
whereas no confirmatory evidence can be obtained for Acceptance and Size (by value).
This is of particular relevance, especially because prior to the IFR becoming applicable,
the EC anticipated that issuer losses caused by the decrease in IF would in fact be
compensated by increases in card spending, mainly driven by a growing acceptance
rate on the merchant side.91 In the case of the Visa 2010 enforcement initiative, this has
not been the case.
Furthermore, and from a methodological perspective it is important to note that
for the majority of tested outcome variables, only a relatively limited and specific set of
explanatory variables led to above results. In many cases, the significance of findings
depended on specific explanatory variables. Issuance was the only case displaying
vastly stronger robustness. Also, one cannot fully exclude the potential impact of
confounding events such as the Mastercard 2007 decision or the (amplifying92) impact
of the IFR. Whilst we cannot state with certainty that the competition enforcement
related to the Visa 2010 decision was the single and most significant driver of the
observable impacts in relation to the outcome variables (an overall development trend
is observable across the European payment landscape prior to this), we can affirm that
the antitrust actions taken did not have a negative impact on welfare (measured by
efficiency metrics such as total market output) and most likely amplified the previously
observable positive trend.
Whilst our findings conform to standard cause-and-effect theories,93 two preva-
lent sources of scepticism deserve to be considered. The first is related to issues arising
89. Transportation and security expenses as well as check-out times for cashiers at the end of the
day are only a few examples. For further detail see Jean Tirole, Payment Card Regulation and the
Use of Economic Analysis in Antitrust, 7(1) Competition Pol’y Int’l 137, 158, (2011).
90. See Communication on Digital Finance package, European Commission (24 September 2020)
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/200924-digital-finance-proposals_en; European Com-
mission: Digital Finance package, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-
and-finance/consumer-finance-and-payments/payment-services/payment-services_en.
91. See Survey on merchants’ costs of processing cash and card payments, European Commission
(March 2015) https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/dgcomp_final_
report_en.pdf; Proposal for a Regulation on interchange fees for card-based payment transac-
tions, supra n. 72.
92. Due to its scope (all domestic and cross-border credit and debit transactions) as well as its size
(IF were reduced in some regions by up to 80%).
93. It is noteworthy that whilst the utilised methodology by the EC to assess optimal interchange
fees was developed by Rochet and Tirole, both authors clearly state that due to spillover effects,
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out of cross-country examinations, namely reverse causality and omitted causal
factors.94 The second, inescapable in any ex post assessment, concerns the counterfac-
tual. Would the growth momentum, observable for most countries during the infringe-
ment phase have continued (potentially at a slower rate) but for policy intervention?
What impacts did the progressive reduction of IF have on innovation?95 How has the
reduction in IF, alongside other provisions and changes to (acquiring) rules, impacted
market concentration? Would the development of scheme fees (charged by the card
schemes to issuers and acquirers – i.e., the revenue of the card scheme) have been
different in the absence of competition enforcement, and ultimately regulation, of IF?96
In light of the above and the fact that results obtained from other empirical
research97 show anomalies or contradictions in relation to economic (two-sided
market) theory, we suggest further research in this field, in specific related to a
potential tipping point within two-sided markets. We argue that whilst the economic
notions related to card payment markets98 are certainly logical, consumer payment
behaviour continues to be highly (if not most significantly) influenced by cultural
habits;99 the IF remains a hidden price to consumers. Thus, the economic rationale for
antitrust involvement needs to be re-assessed for markets that have surpassed a certain
size. Once a card network adoption has reached a point known as tipping, price
adjustments produce only insignificant or minimal effects on output. Most conse-
quences will in turn become distributional, which confronts policymakers with hard
questions. Often, congressional legislation is a more legitimate process to address
distributional issues than decision or rulemaking by expert agencies.
In light of the above, let us now say a word about some of the controversies that
have been associated with the IF ‘saga’. Whilst contradicting views exist in terms of
certain nuances of the tourist test/MIT methodology, a rather common agreement
amongst scholars and practitioners is that cost-based approaches are suboptimal when
diverging demand elasticities and market power it is not in the interest of card associations to set
interchange fees that deviate markedly from the social optimum. See Rochet and Tirole, supra
n. 8.
94. Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Good Economics for Hard Times: Better Answers to Our
Biggest Problems (Juggernaut Books 2019).
95. Stuart E. Weiner and Julian Wright, Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and
Determinants, 4(4) Rev. Network Econ. 321 (2005).
96. Veljan, Regulating the Uncontrollable: The Development of Card Scheme Fees in Payments
Markets in Light of Recent Policy Intervention, supra n. 29.
97. See Veljan, A Critical Review of the European Commission’s Multilateral Interchange Fee
Regulation, supra n. 71; Veljan and Roaidi, An Event Study Analysis of the Impacts of the
European Interchange Fee Regulation, supra n. 86; Study on the application of the Interchange Fee
Regulation, European Commission, supra n. 87.
98. These include but are not limited to following examples. A reduction in the MSC will c.p. drive
increased card acceptance by merchants; a reduction of interchange fees will c.p. lead to reduced
card benefits and lower card issuance and uptake; fee reductions for acquirers will c.p. lead to
reductions in fees for merchants and subsequently consumers.
99. Position on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Interchange Fees for Card-Based Payment Transactions, Die Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft (12
December 2013), https://die-dk.de/media/files/GBIC_Position_MIF_EN_20131212_dPNf1id_r
8YBDbt.pdf. This includes exogenous influences such as a pandemic which has impacted the
uptake of (contactless) card payments more than any other influence thus far.
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determining IF.100 What is more problematic is the non-transparent manner in which
the EC has applied the methodology to determine the benchmark rates of 0.3% for
credit and 0.2% for debit/ prepaid cards. From an economic perspective, these deviate
from the results of EC’s official publications about costs within European card payment
markets.101
Further, the initial scope of antitrust intervention targeted only a minimal fraction
of total payments made, i.e., less than 5%.102 It took a decade to enlarge the scope of
transactions that would fall under antitrust actions. A benefit of this is a rather
incremental market impact, that minimises the costs of policy error, including by
limiting the costs of reversibility. Moreover, this suggests that the EC followed a
pragmatic and evidence-based policy spirit based on learning from experience. A
downside for research lies however in the fact that the market interventions (up to the
IFR) could not be evaluated accurately as the reductions in cross-border (and in certain
countries domestic fallback) IF did not vastly impact the total costs of card acceptance.
Within our models the variable Interchange was insignificant at all times. Other
unintended consequences primarily stem from the characteristics of two-sided markets
which are based on elements such as spillover effects, intra-and inter-system compe-
tition103 as well as an inverted competition with regard to card schemes.104
When focusing on a single price component within card networks, we are
confronted with two main limitations. On the one hand, reductions in IF can lead to
(disproportionate105) increases in other fee components. Put more graphically, the
various fees charged to merchants might be substitutes to each other, a problem known
as the waterbed effect. On the other hand, the ultimate cost decrease for merchants and
in turn for cardholders is dependent on the pass-through within acquiring as well as
merchant sectors. This, again, is an empirical question.
One way to think about it is that competition in merchant markets plays a key role
to ensure that reductions in IF fees are transferred to end-users. With this background,
a historical analysis of industry concentration in merchant markets can provide a proxy
for changes in demand elasticities, and in turn give economic insights on changes in
pass-through rates. We try to shed light on this matter by analysing (1) the relationship
between concentration and pass-through within the US acquiring market pre-and
100. Guthrie and Wright, supra n. 23.
101. See Survey on merchants’ costs of processing cash and card payments, European Commission,
supra n. 72.
102. Commission Decision 2009/C 264/04 on Case COMP/34.579—MasterCard, Case
COMP/36.518—EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580—Commercial Cards, supra n. 31.
103. Alen Veljan, Influence of Intra-and Inter-system Concentration on the Pre-regulated Setting of
Interchange Fees Within Cooperative Card Payment Networks, supra n. 9.
104. Guthrie and Wright, supra n. 23.
105. Fee amendments can follow an asymmetric development, meaning that scheme fees can
increase on the acquirer side whilst potentially stagnating or even being reduced on the issuer
side. This poses a risk to the effectiveness of the market involvement. This risk was ultimately
recognised and circumvention prohibited as part of the IFR. See Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based
payment transactions, supra n. 1. Also, cardholder fees on the issuing side as well as benefits
associated to card usage can disproportionately deviate, i.e., increase due to interchange
reductions so that the net cardholder impact may in fact be negative.
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post-regulatory involvement and (2) the profitability of European acquirer’s pre- and
post-competition enforcement and regulation.
For the US acquiring market, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) did not
significantly change between 2004 and 2016. HHI levels ranged between 1,046 in 2011
and 1,531 in 2005 and no trend development, apart from a relatively equal dispersion
around the mean of 1,206 is observable during this period. What is interesting is the
fact that the pass-through rates significantly decreased post implementation of the
Durbin Amendment on 1 October 2011.106 During the three years preceding the
regulation the pass-through rate was on average 91%, whereas in the five years
post-regulation it averaged 81%.
Year HHI MSC Debit IC Fee Debit
2009 1150 1.63% 1.49%
2010 1078 1.59% 1.40%
2011 1046 1.39% 1.31%
2012 1062 0.78% 0.65%
2013 1071 0.76% 0.60%
2014 1153 0.75% 0.60%
2015 1152 0.74% 0.60%
2016 1229 0.73% 0.59%
As far as the European acquiring landscape is concerned, HHI levels ranged between
252 and 356 over the period 2004–2019.107 Contrary to media reports108 and large
merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements, we do not observe clear concentrative
trends in merchant markets. This can be attributable to the fact that the majority of
M&A activity has spanned over multiple countries or even continents (Nets acquisition
of Concardis; FIS acquisition of Worldpay) and involved companies with different roles
within the payment chain (ACI acquires SpeedPay; Ingenico acquires Bambora and
B+S Card Services).
That said, statistically significant results can be obtained in relation to the
profitability of European acquirers. We have looked at a data set of three acquirers (two
German acquirers and one pan-European acquirer; all within the top thirty European
106. Directed by the Durbin Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve Board caps
interchange fees charged by financial institutions with more than USD 10 billion in assets for
debit card payments. For further information see Federal Reserve issues a final rule establishing
standards for debit card interchange fees and prohibiting network exclusivity arrangements and
routing restrictions, Federal Reserve System (29 June 2011), Federal Reserve Board – Federal
Reserve issues a final rule establishing standards for debit card interchange fees and prohibiting
network exclusivity arrangements and routing restrictions.
107. For a detailed overview of in-market concentration within acquiring markets, please see Alen
Veljan, Influence of Intra-and Inter-system Concentration on the Pre-regulated Setting of
Interchange Fees Within Cooperative Card Payment Networks, supra n. 9.
108. See Three M&A Waves Reshaping the Banking Payments Acceptance Segment, Ernst & Young
Global Limited (2 March 2021), https://www.ey.com/en_gl/banking-capital-markets/three-m
-a-waves-reshaping-the-banking-payment-acceptance-segment.
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acquirers by volume during the last two decades). Whilst this sample cannot be
regarded as representative, we have been unable to gather a larger sample due to
changes in ownership and corporate structure across the time span of fifteen years
(2005–2019) and/ or the majority of acquiring firms either acting as card issuers
simultaneously (see Crédit Mutuel or Barclays) or having a strong(er) presence in
adjacent markets such as technical gateway services (see Ingenico or Adyen).
With these limitations in mind, our analysis suggests that the profits of every firm
in the sample have significantly increased in both 2012 (post-enforcement related to
Visa Europe 2010 decision) as well as 2016 (post- IFR).109 For the two German
acquirers, profits averaged EUR 12.9 million and EUR 4.7 million from 2005 (2006) to
2010. In 2011 these were EUR 19.5 and EUR 14.3 million respectively, i.e., 51% and
over 300% higher. Similar results can be seen for the pan-European acquirer which
averaged negative profits of EUR 9 million between 2006 and 2010 and recorded profits
of EUR 14.6 million in 2011. A similar trend is observable for the first-year post-IFR
implementation. Profits for the two German acquirers averaged EUR 89.6 and EUR 19.1
million respectively during the years 2012 to 2015. In 2016 these were EUR 115.6
million and EUR 89.6 million; up by 29% and 470%. The pan-European acquirer
averaged profits of EUR 76.2 million during the four years preceding the IFR and EUR
305 million in 2016; an increase of 400%.110 These findings suggest areas for future
research. Our findings hint that competition enforcement led to distributional effects
favouring acquirers over merchants and subsequently end-users, i.e., consumers. It
would thus be helpful to assemble a more representative sample, to test whether this
effect can be observed at a larger scale. Though the General Court in Glaxo confirmed
that the benefits of enforcement under Article 101(1) TFEU need not accrue to
end-users, it is always helpful to understand which categorical interests the policy
tends to favour.
§3.08 DISCUSSION OF LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we provide some legal comments on the EC’s enforcement of compe-
tition against IF between 2002 and 2019. We address in particular the fact that the
baseline theory of harm changed from a restriction of competition by effect to a
109. According to The Nilson Report the selected firms had an average annual growth rate between
10% and 14% in terms of processed transaction numbers. A potential positive impact on
revenues in 2016, caused by the Visa Inc. acquisition of Visa Europe cannot be excluded. See
Visa Inc. Completes Acquisition of Visa Europe, Visa Inc. (21 June 2016), https://investor.visa.
com/news/news-details/2016/Visa-Inc-Completes-Acquisition-of-Visa-Europe/default.aspx
and Steve Slater, European Banks Set for Windfall from Visa Europe Deal: Sources, Reuters (16
October 2015, 18:45) https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-visa-europe-banks/european-banks-
set-for-windfall-from-visa-europe-deal-sources-idUKKCN0SA26M20151016.
110. Above profits may be slightly inflated due to the windfall from Visa Inc’s acquisition of Visa
Europe, which at the point in time was owned by more than 3,000 banks and payment firms.
We tried to reduce this impact by avoiding the top acquirers (British banks alone would have
accounted for 40% of the kick-back; much of the rest residing with French, Italian and Spanish
payment providers) whilst selecting firms that would have been impacted by the regulatory
enforcement. See Slater, supra n. 109.
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restriction by object (which is not unusual per se), but also the manner in which the
benchmark for setting the exemptible level of IFs (i.e., the tourist test of MIT) has left
room for improvement (as well as other points – in no particular order).
[A] No Specification of Pass-Through Mechanisms
None of the above EC decisions contained a mechanism seeking to induce acquirers to
pass on IF reductions (in whole) to merchants (whether in the form of a commitment
in the Visa/ Mastercard commitment decisions, or a remedy in relation to the
Mastercard infringement decisions). One exception though is the Visa Europe 2014
commitments decision in which Visa Europe committed to change its scheme rules so
that an acquirer would be forced to charge a merchant an MSC on an ‘IF plus plus’ if
that merchant requested such an MSC (as opposed to a blended MSC).
It is surprising that the EC did not require (in commitment decisions) or impose
(as a remedy in infringement decisions) the card schemes to implement a rule change
forcing acquirers to pass on the reduction of IF to merchants, much like in the Visa
Europe 2014 commitments. Presumably the EC believed that market forces, and in
particular, competition between acquirers, as well as transparency on the reduced
levels of IF, would be enough to ensure a sufficient level of pass-through by acquirers
to merchants?
With the benefit of hindsight, it would probably have been more effective for the
EC to mandate such a requirement in all its decisions.111
As regards the reduction of MSC perceived by merchants, the EC never imposed
a mechanism to ensure that merchants would in turn pass on that reduction of costs to
their customers (e.g., consumers) in the form of lower (retail) prices. This makes sense
since this would probably have been an impossible task for the EC to monitor. The EC
assumed that the intensity of the competition between merchants would be enough to
ensure a pass-through to consumers.112
111. Further to the IFR (rather the competition law enforcement against IF), it would appear from
the EY study on the IFR commissioned by the EC (Study on the application of the Interchange
Fee Regulation, EY on behalf of European Commission (2020), https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/reports/kd0120161enn.pdf) and the EC report on the IFR (Report on
the application of Regulation (EU) 2015/751 on interchange fees for card-based payment
transaction, European Commission (29 June 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors
/financial_services/IFR_report_card_payment.pdf) that a significant proportion of the IF re-
duction caused by the IFR effective 9 December 2015 was not passed on to merchants:
‘Acquirers have gained revenue of EUR 1,200 million per year coming from lower interchange
fee savings and offset by larger scheme fees and pass-through to merchants, the latter likely to
increase over time (gains to acquirers were calculated indirectly).’ (page 6).
112. In relation to the IFR: For information, the EC’s conclusion under the IFR is as follows: ‘A key
yardstick for the assessment of the effects of the IFR is its impact on retail prices for consumers.
As the change in interchange fees induced by the caps of the IFR results in a very small impact
per transaction, it makes it notoriously challenging to determine pass-through rates, which is
the share of interchange fees reductions which are passed on as reductions of final consumer
prices. However, since interchange fees transmitted through MSCs are one of several cost
factors for merchants, competition between merchants should result – in the longer run – in
interchange fee reductions being reflected in lower prices or improvement of services on the
consumer side’ (Report on the application of Regulation (EU) 2015/751 on interchange fees for
card-based payment transaction, European Commission, supra n. 111, page 6).
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[B] Mixed, but Non-simultaneous Enforcement
The chronological summary shows that the EC’s policy towards payment systems has
consisted in a mix of commitment decisions (against Visa and Mastercard), and of
infringement decisions (against Mastercard only). This approach can be an efficient
way for policymakers to reduce consumer harm due to competition law violations:
infringement decisions provide clarity on the law and set a precedent, whilst commit-
ment decisions enable the EC to shape markets going forward and suggest safe
harbours for market participants.
At the same time, the main feature of the Commission’s policy is one of
asynchronous enforcement. Expecting that its decisions would generate industry-level
guidance and compliance, the EC enforced competition law, one market player at a
time, anticipating that the other market player would do the same. The facts at our
disposal suggest that this is not the case. Visa and Mastercard pursued distinct legal
strategies. In reality, we see here that the case-specific nature of competition enforce-
ment produces limited effects on third parties.
More importantly, the fact that the EC never dealt with Visa and Mastercard at the
same time (except in the April 2019 commitment decisions) means that the two
competitors were never subject to the same ‘rules of the game’ and therefore to a level
playing. Instead, since 2002, one organisation was always required to do more than the
other – and it typically required quite a few years from the EC to get the competitor do
so the same, but then even more than its competitor – before turning back (again) to
the first competitor:
– Visa was at a competitive disadvantage between 2002 and July 2008 in relation
to the level of its cross-border IF.
– Then Mastercard was at a competitive disadvantage between July 2008 and,
respectively, 2010 for debit and 2014 for credit in relation to cross-border IF.
– And Visa was at a competitive disadvantage in relation to domestic IF since
2010, first in relation to debit only in 9 EEA countries, then in relation to all
cards (credit and debit) as from January 2015 further to its commitment on
cross-border acquiring. Clearly the commitments on cross-border acquiring
put Visa Europe at competitive disadvantage as from 1 January 2015 since a
Visa cross-border acquired transaction would attract less IF for the issuer (i.e.,
0.2%/0.3%) than a Mastercard cross-border acquired transaction (that would
attract the IF of the country of the merchant/issuer).
One can question whether this is optimal competition law enforcement. Argu-
ably, the EC should have enforced competition law at the same time against both
competitors, as it did in relation to the 2019 commitments on inbound interregional
transactions. Or it could have used tools like sector inquiries to study industry-wide
practices from distinct firms on equal footing.
Moreover, this is potentially unfair. As mentioned above, there has been no
competition law enforcement against the IF, or equivalent fees to IF, that was being
applied by three-party schemes like American Express (and a fortiori no private actions
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for damages against American Express, at least as far as we are aware). This situation
is recognised today in the IFR, which seeks to ensure a level playing between
traditional four-party card schemes such as Visa, Mastercard, Cartes Bancaires,
Bancontact, etc., and three-party schemes sometimes operating as a four-party scheme.
[C] On Default IF as Restrictions ‘By Object’
As was also hopefully clear from the above chronological summary, the EC’s thinking,
and indeed the EU Court’s case law, has evolved over the years in relation to several
issues, including the issue of restriction by object or by effect.113
Although the EC has relied on the same counterfactual for the default IF since
2002 (i.e., no default IF to be paid by acquirer to issuer, coupled with a prohibition of
ex post pricing), the EC has evolved from ‘no object – only effect’ in its Visa
International 2002, to ‘effect – and perhaps object?’ in its Mastercard 2007, to ‘object
and effect’ in its Visa 2010 (which was before the EC won before the General Court, in
2012, in the Mastercard case) and Visa 2014 decision – to ultimately reach the
qualification of ‘horizontal price-fixing’ arrangement in the Visa/ Mastercard 2019
commitment decisions.
Of course, since the Visa 2010, Visa 2014 and Visa/ Mastercard 2019 decisions
were commitment decisions, the EC’s object qualification was technically only prelimi-
nary. However when the EC reiterates an object ‘preliminary assessment’ across
several decisions, over a period of nine years, we believe that one can legitimately draw
the conclusion that the EC really is of the view that there is a restriction of competition
by object. In particular when during that period, in 2018, as part of an amicus curiae
submission made as part of the merchant lawsuits against Visa and Mastercard in the
UK, the EC stated that ‘As such, it is appropriate to draw an analogy with a cartel
between all acquiring banks to charge their customers a substantially inflated fee.’114
It is of course legitimate for the EC to change its policy over time, in particular in
relation to complex topics such as the legal and economic assessment of IF in
competition cases. However, when policy change occurs, one would expect the EC to
(1) explicitly acknowledge in its decision a change in position and (2) to explain in its
decisions what justifies the evolution in its position. This is not only a good rule of
practice, but the case law of the CJEU actually requires accountability from the EC
when it incrementally develops its decisional practice over a series of cases:
Although a decision which fits into a well-established line of decisions may be
reasoned in a summary manner, for example by a reference to those decisions, if
113. Not to mention that the EC seems to have steadily changed its position on the acceptable level
of IF.
114. Written observations of the European Commission in Mastercard Inc. and others, vs. Sains-
bury’s Supermarkets Limited, para. 28, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/visa_
mastercard_commission_observation1_en.pdf.
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it goes appreciably further than the previous decisions, the Commission must give
an account of its reasoning.115
In so far as IF are concerned, the EC has not observed this rule of practice. There
is no explanation in the various EC decisions as to what justified the evolution from
effect to object (and in particular price-fixing).
Any antitrust observer looking at the latest EC pronouncement on IF will come
away with more questions than answers. In 2019, the EC reached the somewhat
puzzling finding that the default IF under investigation were tantamount to ‘horizontal
price-fixing’/‘price fixing’116 arrangement, but that they met the conditions for an
exemption (again, after a committed reduction of the level).
Of course, it is not impossible in theory for a restriction by object to meet the
conditions for an exemption under Article 101(3).117 The Court has actually confirmed
this in its 2020 judgment in Budapest Bank.118 The hard question is, however, that the
narrow circumstances in which a horizontal price-fixing arrangement can be found to
meet the Article 101(3) TFEU conditions are left entirely underspecified in practice,
leading to genuine legal uncertainty.
In effect, the EC granted exemptions on several occasions. In the Visa Europe
2010 and 2014 decisions, the EC found that a restriction of competition by object had
met the conditions for an exception (albeit after a committed reduction of the level).
And in its Mastercard/ Visa 2019 commitments decisions, the EC even concluded that
a price-fixing arrangement had met the conditions for an exemption (albeit, again, after
a committed reduction of the level).
What is more important, however, is that the substantial recourse to Article
101(3) TFEU begs the question whether the qualification of restriction by object is
really adequate in the first place – in particular after the Court of Justice judgments in
Cartes Bancaires (2014) and Budapest Bank (2020).
In its 2010 and 2014 Visa Europe commitment decisions, the EC stated that the
default IF is a restriction of competition by object because ‘The MIFs appeared to inflate
the base on which acquirers set the MSCs by creating an important cost element common
to all acquirers.’119
115. Case 73-74, Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique and others v. Commission,
26 November 1975, ECLI:EU:C:1975:160, para. 31.
116. Commission Decision of 29 April 2019 in Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II, supra n. 35, para. 33.
Commission Decision of 29 April 2019 in Case AT.39398 – Visa MIF, supra n. 35, para. 34.
117. See, e.g., European Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ,
C 101/97, 27.4.2004, para. 46; See also the EC Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ
C11/1, 14.1.2011; See also Guidance on restrictions of competition ‘by object’ for the purpose
of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, accompanying Notice
on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under
Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), OJ
C 291, 30.8.2014.
118. Case C-228/18, Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v. Budapest Bank Nyrt. and Others, 2.4.2020,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:265, paras 41–42.
119. Commission Decision of 8 December 2010 in Case COMP/39.398—VISA MIF, supra n. 32, para.
21 and Commission Decision of 26 February 2014 in Case AT.39398 – VISA MIF, supra n. 33,
para. 23.
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In 2019, the EC went further by saying that:
rules on inter-regional MIFs amount to horizontal price-fixing. The inter-regional
MIFs fix a significant component of the price charged to merchants for acquiring
services through the MSCs. The Commission came to the preliminary conclusion
that the restriction of competition on price follows from the very substance of [the]
rules on inter-regional MIFs. The Commission also came to the preliminary conclu-
sion that the objective of [the] rules on inter-regional MIFs is to fix a part of the price
charged to merchants and to restrict competition to the benefit of [the card scheme]
Mastercard and its members/licensees, primarily the issuers. Such price fixing is by
its very nature harmful to competition and reveals in itself a sufficient degree of
harm to competition to be considered a restriction of competition ‘by object’120
However, it appears from the Budapest Bank judgment that the mere fact that
Hungarian issuers and acquirers had agreed to a MIF applicable to domestic transac-
tions in Hungary, ‘even assuming that the MIF Agreement had inter alia as its objective
the fixing of a minimum threshold applicable to the [MSC]’, was not enough to qualify
the restriction of competition between acquirers as a restriction by object. In other
words, the justifications provided by the EC in its 2010, 2014 and 2019 decisions are (in
our view) not sufficient, in light of Budapest Bank, to justify the existence of a
restriction by object. Rather than paraphrasing, we think that a (fairly long) quote from
the judgment is helpful:
51. […] in order to determine whether an agreement between undertakings or a
decision by an association of undertakings reveals a sufficient degree of harm to
competition to be considered a restriction of competition ‘by object’ … regard must
be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal
context of which it forms a part. […]
54. […] the concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ must be interpreted
restrictively. The concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ can be applied
only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a
sufficient degree of harm to competition for it to be found that there is no need to
examine their effects, as otherwise the Commission would be exempted from the
obligation to prove the actual effects on the market of agreements which are in no
way established to be, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of
competition. […]
[…]
65. Although it is clear from the documents before the Court that specific
percentages and amounts were used in the MIF Agreement for the purposes of
fixing the interchange fees, the content of that agreement does not, however,
necessarily point to a restriction ‘by object’, in the absence of proven harmfulness
of the provisions of that agreement to competition. […]
71. […] certain information contained in the documents before the Court tends to
indicate that one objective of the MIF Agreement was to ensure a degree of balance
between the issuing and acquisition activities within the card payment system at
issue in the main proceedings.
120. Commission Decision of 29 April 2019 in Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II, supra n. 35, para. 33.
Commission Decision of 29 April 2019 in Case AT.39398 – Visa MIF, supra n. 35, para. 34.
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[…]
73. It cannot be ruled out that such information points to the fact that the MIF
Agreement was pursuing an objective consisting not in guaranteeing a minimum
threshold for service charges but in establishing a degree of balance between the
‘issuing’ and ‘acquisition’ activities within each of the card payment systems at
issue in the main proceedings in order to ensure that certain costs resulting from
the use of cards in payment transactions are covered, whilst protecting those
systems from the undesirable effects that would arise from an excessively high
level of interchange fees and thus, as the case may be, of service charges.
[…]
76. Indeed, as the Advocate General has stated in points 54 and 63 to 73 of his
Opinion, in order to justify an agreement being classified as a restriction of
competition ‘by object’, without an analysis of its effects being required, there
must be sufficiently reliable and robust experience for the view to be taken that
that agreement is, by its very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of
competition.
[…]
78 Second, as regards the acquiring market in Hungary, even assuming that the
MIF Agreement had inter alia as its objective the fixing of a minimum threshold
applicable to the service charges [read: the MSC], the Court has not been provided
with sufficient information to establish that that agreement posed a sufficient
degree of harm to competition on that market for a restriction of competition ‘by
object’ to be found to exist. It is, however, for the referring court to carry out the
necessary verifications in that respect.
79 In particular, in the present instance, subject to those verifications, it is not
possible to conclude on the basis of the information produced for this purpose that
sufficiently general and consistent experience exists for the view to be taken that the
harmfulness of an agreement such as that at issue in the main proceedings to
competition justifies dispensing with any examination of the specific effects of that
agreement on competition. The information relied on by the Competition Author-
ity, the Hungarian Government and the Commission in that connection, that is to
say, primarily, that authority’s decision-making practice and the case-law of the
Courts of the European Union, specifically demonstrates, as things currently stand,
the need to conduct an in-depth examination of the effects of such an agreement in
order to ascertain whether it actually had the effect of introducing a minimum
threshold applicable to the service charges and whether, having regard to the
situation which would have prevailed if that agreement had not existed, the
agreement was restrictive of competition by virtue of its effects.
80. Finally, with regard to the context of which the MIF Agreement formed a part,
in the first place, it is true that, as the Commission maintains, the complexity of the
card payment systems of the type at issue in the main proceedings, the bilateral
nature of those systems in itself and the existence of vertical relationships between
the different types of economic operators concerned are not, in themselves,
capable of precluding classification of the MIF Agreement as a restriction ‘by
object’ […]. That said, the fact remains that such an anticompetitive object must
be established.
[…]
82 In the event that the referring court were also to find there to be, a priori, strong
indications capable of demonstrating that the MIF Agreement triggered […]
upwards pressure [on the level of IF] or, at the very least, contradictory or
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ambivalent evidence in that regard, such indications or evidence cannot be
ignored by that court in its examination of whether, in the present instance, there
is a restriction ‘by object’. Contrary to what it appears may be inferred from the
Commission’s written observations in this connection, the fact that, if there had
been no MIF Agreement, the level of interchange fees resulting from competition
would have been higher is relevant for the purposes of examining whether there is
a restriction resulting from that agreement, since such a factor specifically concerns
the alleged anticompetitive object of that agreement as regards the acquiring
market in Hungary, namely that that agreement limited the reduction of the
interchange fees and, consequently, the downwards pressure that merchants
could have exerted on the acquiring banks in order to secure a reduction in the
service charges.
83 In addition, if there were to be strong indications that, if the MIF Agreement had
not been concluded, upwards pressure on interchange fees would have ensued, so
that it cannot be argued that that agreement constituted a restriction ‘by object’ of
competition on the acquiring market in Hungary, an in-depth examination of the
effects of that agreement should be carried out, as part of which, in accordance with
the case-law recalled in paragraph 55 of the present judgment, it would be
necessary to examine competition had that agreement not existed in order to
assess the impact of the agreement on the parameters of competition and thereby
to determine whether it actually entailed restrictive effects on competition.
Put another way: if the above commitment decisions (2010, 2014 and two in
2019) had been infringement decisions rather than commitments decisions, and had
been challenged by Visa and/or Mastercard before the EU Courts, they, based in
particular on Budapest Bank, would likely have concluded that the mere fact that the
IF (as set by Visa or Mastercard) sets a common de facto floor for the level of the MSC
was not, in itself, sufficient evidence by the EC of the existence of a restriction of
competition by object.
At the same time, Budapest Bank insists on the fact that an agreement can be
named ‘a restriction of competition “by object”’ if there is ‘reliable and robust
experience for the view to be taken that that agreement is, by its very nature, harmful to
the proper functioning of competition’.121 This requirement was recently tested in the
Lundbeck pay-for-delay case.122 What is clear from the pay-for-delay cases is that if a
so-called new form of conduct is, in fact, disguising what amounts to a cartel
arrangement such as market sharing, then there is sufficient accumulated experience
for that conduct to be found restrictive of competition by object. Despite the EC finding
in 2019 that the ‘rules on inter-regional MIFs amount to horizontal price-fixing’, given
its long-standing application of Article 101(3) would it be appropriate to say the rules
were in fact analogous to a cartel? This seems doubtful. That said, our report shows
that given the evolving decisional practice of the EC relating to Visa and Mastercard
over the years, it is arguable that ‘reliable and robust experience’ now exists today.
However, whether it can be said with confidence that a consensus has emerged that the
IF is a restriction of competition by object, which has regularly weaved its way into
121. Case C-228/18, Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v. Budapest Bank Nyrt. and Others, supra n. 118, at
para. 76.
122. Case C-591/16P, Lundbeck v. Commission, 25.3.21, ECLI:EU:C:2021:243.
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decisional practice both in the EU Courts and EC, is not quite so clear-cut. Certainly, the
EC has failed to produce, in the context of the proceedings, evidence showing that its
own experience leaned in this direction and, likewise, failed to explain that its thinking
has evolved and why.
Given the fact that IF is now regulated by the IFR in relation to consumer cards,
the only way for the qualification of default IF as a restriction by object to be tested
would be a legal challenge in relation to the IF applicable to commercial cards (which
are not subject to caps under the IFR). However, to our knowledge there is no ongoing
competition law enforcement against Visa or Mastercard (or domestic schemes’)
commercial card IF. This begs the question whether more frequent ex post assessment,
and disclosure by the EC, might improve legal certainty, by providing competition law
subjects with a better understanding of what the EC’s ‘experience’ teaches them, and
whether their agreement leans towards falling within the object box, or will be subject
to a thorough market inquiry of its ‘effects’.
[D] Evolution in the EC’s Thinking Regarding the Methodology to Set
the Exemptible Level of IF
Another evolution in the EC’s approach concerns the methodology deemed suitable to
set the level of exemptible IF. Whilst the EC initially considered some of the costs borne
by issuers in 2002, it moved in 2009 to an evaluation based on the costs borne by
merchants (in particular their cost of cash) under the so-called tourist test/MIT.
Interestingly, the EU had explicitly discarded the cost of cash as a relevant benchmark
in 2002, noting that ‘… as concerns cash and cheques, neither of these can be considered
as substitutable with payment cards, either from the point of view of merchants or that
of consumers. For merchants first of all, such non-card payment instruments are not at
all substitutable with cards, since the loss of revenue for merchants from ceasing to
accept all cards would be far greater than the loss of revenue from increasing their
general level of prices by the amount of any small but sustained increase in merchant
fees for all cards …’.123
The EC’s methodological evolution has also been accompanied by an evolution of
the IF levels deemed exemptible: from EUR 28 cents (approximately 0.5%) for debit/
0.7% for credit in 2002, down to 0.2% for debit and prepaid/0.3% for credit since 2009,
and more recently in 2019 0.2%/0.3% for CP debit (including prepaid) and credit
respectively and 1.15%/1.50% for CNP debit (including prepaid) and credit.
For CNP transactions, the fact that the EC accepted that cash is not an appropriate
comparator for inbound interregional CNP (e.g., online) transactions, but instead
e-wallet transactions with higher costs such as Paypal for example were an appropriate
comparator, and therefore, on the basis of the MIT, allowed higher levels that
0.2%/0.3%, is an interesting evolution. Surely cash was already not an appropriate
comparator for CNP transactions in 2008 in relation to Intra-EEA transactions, whereas
123. Commission Decision 2002/914/EC – Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, supra
n. 18, para. 48.
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e-wallets (e.g., Paypal) was. It therefore begs the question why the higher levels of
1.15%/1.50% were not already accepted in the 2009 Mastercard Unilateral Undertak-
ings and/or in the 2015 IFR.
This problem of time inconsistency shines a bright light on the challenges of
determining IF levels that are exemptible under Article 101(3) TFEU, and more
generally, on the incredible level of uncertainty, discretion and subjectivity involved in
any such exercise. It also highlights the risk of competition law potentially being used
to regulate the level of fees.
Make no mistake. There is no suggestion here that the EC should stick to a given
methodology. Rather, the point is that changes in methodology should be (1) explicitly
acknowledged and (2) reasoned. Absent this, the evolution in the EC’s position leaves
itself open to an interpretation whereby the EC was in reality using its competition law
powers to directly regulate fee levels (which is something that EuroCommerce itself
was claiming in relation to the proposed Visa 2002 exempted levels, but which the EC
denied in its 2002 decision – as well as later in the MEMO that accompanied the
Mastercard 2007 decision124), which is an activity traditionally reserved to regulation/
legislation.
[E] Legal Uncertainty
It is not an understatement to say that there has been substantial legal uncertainty for
a very long time about the levels of IF deemed legal under competition law. The various
points discussed above (e.g., no simultaneous enforcement, the evolution in the EC’s
thinking on the type of restriction, evolutions on the EC’s thinking on exemption), as
well as other factors such as the enforcement by NCAs in some EEA countries (but not
all) which lead to different results and in particular different exemptible levels (e.g.,
0.28% in France), have all combined to create an environment of considerable fluidity,
complexity, and instability.
By contrast, it is harder to ponder about the consequences of legal uncertainty in
relation to IFs. One conjecture, however, is that the ever-changing competition policy
environment might have prevented markets from producing clear price signals that
would have been needed to support the creation of a European version of Visa or
Mastercard, despite various EC and ECB calls for the creation of such a European
124. ‘The Commission considers that MIF’s must be examined under Articles 81(1) and 81(3) of the
EC Treaty on a case by case basis. However, like any other agreement that restricts competi-
tion, interchange fee agreements must fulfil the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of
the EC Treaty. This also holds for an entirely new (that means materially different) MIF in the
MasterCard scheme should MasterCard choose to continue operating with this mechanism.
Otherwise, the MIF is illegal. If the criteria of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty are not met, the
Commission would adopt a cease and desist order and, if appropriate, impose fines. However,
the Commission could not set a different level of interchange fee. The Commission does not apply
competition rules to regulate the level of interchange fees.’ – Antitrust: Commission prohibits
MasterCard’s intra-EEA Multilateral Interchange Fees – frequently asked questions, European
Commission (19 December 2007), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
MEMO_07_590.
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scheme.125 This issue is very topical at the moment with the renewed proposal to create
a European Visa/Mastercard, referred to as the European Payment Initiative (EPI).
In addition, despite the above legal uncertainty that the EC competition law
enforcement created for a number of years, Mastercard and Visa are facing very
significant private actions for damages for hundreds of millions of pounds. Mastercard
is also facing a very significant consumer class action in the UK for GBP 14 billion (as
well as apparently in Portugal, as was recently announced in the press). It would seem
that Visa and Mastercard are essentially being treated by claimants as if it had always
been clear that they were acting in breach of competition law, and in particular were
involved in so-called price-fixing to use the EC’s 2019 terminology – whereas, as
mentioned above, this understanding was of course not the case. There was genuine
legal uncertainty in the market, for many years, as to the legality, or not, of IF up to
certain, then undefined, levels.
[F] Evolution in the EC’s Thinking Regarding Cross-Border Acquiring
In the early days, the EC considered acceptable the coherence rule that required similar
IFs to be charged to foreign/cross-border acquirers and domestic acquirers. After
exempting the Visa International rules on cross-border acquiring in 2002, in 2010 the
EC blessed again the Visa Europe rule that required that a cross-border acquirer paid
the same IF as a domestic acquirer, i.e., the IF of the country where the merchant and
issuer are located.
Fast forward to 2014. The EC considered the same rule restrictive of competition
by object and required that a cross-border acquirer paid either the domestic IF of the
country of the merchant/issuer or 0.2%/0.3% (in practice, the latter was generally
lower). The EC did not acknowledge the change in its position. Nor did it explain the
reason for the change in its position.
The EC’s intervention sought to encourage merchants to ‘shop around’ to get
connected to an acquirer outside their own Member States in order to get access to
lower IF (i.e., 0.2%/0.3%). The EC hoped this would increase competition between
domestic and cross-border acquirers. Instead of this, we have seen a number of large
acquirers re-locate to other EEA Member State and continue to serve merchants from
that/those other Member States. For example, a number of UK merchants that were
until then relying upon the acquiring services of WorldPay UK were suddenly acquired
by WorldPay Netherlands, paying 0.2%/0.3% IF rather than UK domestic IF as they
would have if they were still acquired by WorldPay UK. It is therefore not entirely clear
to what extent merchants have really connected to new cross-border acquirers, rather
than continued with the same acquirer but located in another EEA country.
125. See, e.g., ‘The Commission, like the ECB, would welcome the emergence of new pan-European
schemes that would compete with international schemes such as MasterCard and Visa. This
will require a level playing field between the potential newcomers and the incumbent
schemes.’ – Antitrust: Commission prohibits MasterCard’s intra-EEA Multilateral Interchange
Fees – frequently asked questions, European Commission, supra, n. 124.
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However, in 2019, at the time of the Mastercard II decision, it would appear that
the EC’s counterfactual was no longer the same as in the Visa Europe 2014 decision –
but instead was a counterfactual where the acquirer pays the domestic IF of its ‘home’
country. Again, this is a change in the EC’s position without the EC (1) acknowledging
it and (2) justifying it. But this decision also raises a number of other comments; we
only address a few below for the sake of (relative) brevity.
First, since December 2015 and the IFR becoming applicable, the principle is that
the cross-border IF and domestic IF are identical at 0.2%/0.3%, meaning that
cross-border acquirers and domestic acquirers in principle pay the same IF. Therefore,
given that regulatory position, it is curious that the EC identified as restrictive of
competition (by object) a Mastercard rule that was essentially the same as the IFR
regime. In other words, given that the Mastercard (and before it the Visa) rule on
cross-border acquirers was found by the EC as restrictive of competition by object, this
means that the IFR is always restrictive of competition by object and therefore the EC
should propose an immediate legislative change to the IFR. But the EC recently
announced, as part of a report on the IFR, that it was not going to propose changes to
the IFR for now.126 This seems contradictory on the part of the EC.
Second, the IFR allows a Member State to set lower domestic IF, a possibility that
some Member States have used (e.g., Ireland has set a maximum debit IF cap for Irish
domestic transactions at 0.1% rather than the standard 0.2% under the IFR). Domestic
acquirers have access to those lower levels, whereas a cross-border doesn’t have access
to those but instead always pays the 0.2%/0.3% cross-border IF. For example, an
acquirer located in Ireland acquiring an Irish domestic transaction (i.e., merchant and
issuer both in Ireland) will pay a 0.1% IF, whereas an acquirer located in another
Member State (e.g., a German acquirer) will pay cross-border IF, i.e., 0.2%, to acquire
that same Irish domestic transaction – i.e., a higher level of IF than the local Irish
acquirer This puts the German acquirer at a competitive disadvantage versus the local
Irish acquirer.127 Under the EC’s logic, the IFR is even more restrictive of competition
than the Mastercard rule (and before it the Visa rule) was. Again, this means that the
EC should hurry to propose a chance to the IFR to fix this issue … but as mentioned
above, the EC has recently announced it was not minded to change the IFR for now.
Again, this seems inconsistent.
Third, in its 2019 decision, the EC used a counterfactual (‘home’ IF of the country
of the cross-border acquirer) that was different not only from the commitment given by
Visa Europe effective 1 January 2015 (i.e., domestic IF of the country of
merchant/issuer or 0.2%/0.3%) but also different from the regulatory solution that the
126. Antitrust: Commission publishes report on the impact of the Interchange Fees Regulation,
European Commission (29 June 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
en/IP_20_1217.
127. Interestingly, the EC had already indicated in its Visa Europe 2010 commitment decision
(Commission Decision of 8 December 2010 on Case COMP/39.398 – Visa MIF) that a
mechanism that forced cross-border acquirers to pay higher IF than local acquirers ‘[…] was
considered as increasing the anti-competitive effect […] since it puts cross-border acquirers at
disadvantage vis-à-vis their domestic competitors in case the […] domestic MIFs are lower than
the Intra-Regional MIFs’.
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EU legislation had put in place since December 2015 under the IFR (i.e., cross-border
acquirer pays cross-border IF). Shouldn’t the EC have used as a counterfactual the
regime adopted by the EU legislator to assess Mastercard’s practices on cross-border
acquiring? Granted, the infringement period in the EC 2019 decision relates to the
period between February 2014 and 8 December 2015, i.e., pre-IFR. Granted too that the
EC is given quite some flexibility in terms of determining what the relevant counter-
factual or one of the relevant counterfactuals is.128 But if the EU legislator, after having
analysed various possible avenues during the legislative process including the coun-
terfactual used by the EC in its 2019 decision (i.e., having the cross-border acquirer
pays its ‘home’ domestic IF) decided not to follow that approach, but instead to
regulate in a different way (i.e., cross-border acquirer pays cross-border IF), should the
EC be allowed, more than three years after that regulation became applicable, to adopt
a decision, even for past conduct pre-legislation, (1) to use a counterfactual different
from what the legislation requires; and (2) that results in the EU legislation being
considered anticompetitive/putting in place a restriction of competition even more
severe than that allegedly put in place by the (association of) undertaking(s) under
investigation? Should the EC not instead be required to enforce competition law for
pre-legislation conduct in a way that makes it aligned with the legislation /that doesn’t
result in the legislative work of the Council and the EP being suddenly considered as
anticompetitive and even more anticompetitive than the conduct pre-legislation?129
128. See for example the EU Courts in the Mastercard 2012 (T-111/08, MasterCard and Others v.
Commission, 24.5.2012, ECLI:EU:T:2012:260) and 2014 (C-382/12 P, MasterCard and Others v.
Commission, 11.9.2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201) judgments: when Mastercard was arguing that
the counterfactual used by the EC (i.e., no default IF and a prohibition of ex post pricing) was
not one that would have resulted from market forces, but instead was merely the EC’s preferred
regulatory outcome, the Court of Justice stated that ‘[…] the alternatives on which the
Commission may rely in the context of the assessment of the objective necessity of a restriction
are not limited to the situation that would arise in the absence of the restriction in question but
may also extend to other counterfactual hypotheses based, inter alia, on realistic situations that
might arise in the absence of that restriction. The General Court was therefore correct in
concluding, in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal, that the counterfactual hypothesis
put forward by the Commission could be taken into account in the examination of the objective
necessity of the MIF in so far as it was realistic and enabled the MasterCard system to be
economically viable’. – para. 111 of Court of Justice judgement. General Court: ‘while the terms
of that comparison must be realistic … [the EC] was not, however, obliged to demonstrate that
market forces would compel the issuing and acquiring banks themselves to decide to adopt
[that counterfactual]’ (para. 99 – see also para. 132 where rather than ‘realistic’ the GC referred
to ‘economically viable’).
129. Other aspects of Commission Decision of 22 January 2019 on Case AT.40049 – MasterCard II,
supra n. 34, that we do not address here, again for the (relative) brevity, are the fact that the
EC used 27 February 2014 as the beginning of the infringement period, where Visa Europe was
allowed to continue to operate with the same rule until 1 January 2015 – this does not seem to
ensure a level playing field between the two competitors? The Mastercard rule on cross-border
acquiring was found to be in breach of Article 101 for partitioning the internal market by
preventing merchants from working with acquirers in another EEA Member State, but a
number of domestic card scheme (e.g., Bancontact in Belgium, Cartes Bancaires in France), to
our knowledge, either did not allow cross-border acquiring at all, or if they did also apply the
same IF to foreign/cross-border acquirers and domestic acquirers.
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§3.09 CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we find that the policy intervention in relation to the Visa 2010 case has
significantly impacted card payment markets across Europe. Whilst all markets were in
scope in terms of the interchange fee reduction for Intra-EEA transactions, a subset of
nine countries (eight of which form part of our analysis; Iceland has been omitted due
to limited data) have also experienced reductions for domestic debit transactions.
These countries have benefited from a comparatively higher card usage in terms of
network size (by number), predominantly driven by an increased cardholding. Also,
the displacement of cash by electronic payment methods (including card payments)
has been expedited. Our findings are summarised in the table below:
Outcome
Variable




Yes, by 16 payments per capita (22%) Yes
Size (by value) Yes, by EUR 550 per capita (-16%) No
Issuance Yes, by 0.225 cards per capita (16%) Yes
Acceptance No Yes
Displacement Yes, by 4 withdrawals per capita
(−17%)
Yes
Notwithstanding some methodological imperfections and seemingly contradictory
findings (insignificant impact on variable Acceptance) our hypothesis that the EC’s
competition enforcement has had a positive, statistically significant effect on the usage
of consumer card payments, card issuance, merchant acceptance, and cash displace-
ment can be partially confirmed. From the perspective of overall market output, our
results are supportive of the policy expressed in enforcement initiatives like the Visa 2010
decision. Whilst we cannot affirm with certainty that competition enforcement was the
single and most significant driver of the observable impacts in relation to the outcome
variables (an overall development trend is observable across the European payment
landscape before this), we can state that the antitrust actions taken did not have a
negative impact on welfare and market output and most likely amplified the previously
observable positive trend.
From a legal standpoint, the evidence may suggest that the EC has sought to
follow a pragmatic and evidence-based policy spirit based on learning from experience.
However, the unstable ebb and flow of competition policy towards payment systems
might have come at the price of substantial legal uncertainty, disincentivising entry
from one or more European wide schemes.
With the benefit of hindsight, the clear consumer welfare benefits arising from
antitrust intervention might have justified faster regulation. Although price regulation
should only be a last resort, generalising the benefits of bilateral enforcement in a
broadly applicable instrument would have avoided some of the potential legal issues
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that we flagged above. To draw a comparison, the EC moved much more quickly to
regulate roaming charges in communications markets.130 In relation to IF, the draft IFR
proposed by the EC in July 2013 ‘builds on 20 years of experience in competition
cases’.131 Twenty years is obviously a very long time … .
130. With SOs sent to mobile network operations (MNOs) in 2005 and 2006, and a proposed
regulation already in 2006.
131. Factsheet on the interchange fees regulation, European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/factsheet_interchange_fees_en.pdf.
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